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ABSTRACT 
With the ongoing miniaturization of components, the utility of smaller satellites is 
increasing.  Many believe in the near future that small satellites will be able to perform 
all functions that larger satellites currently perform today.  It has been suggested that 
these satellites will be less expensive, thus offer a lower risk to the consumer in case they 
fail before their mission design life.  This paper looked at the ability to build and operate 
smaller satellites with current technology to perform covert Space Control and Space 
Situational Awareness missions near geostationary orbit.  The investigation determined if 
space qualified Commercial Off The Shelf (COTS) components and current technology 
could be used to build covert smaller satellites.  The largest satellite was sized to be 
undetectable from earth based sensors.  Subsequent CubeSat sizes were selected to 
determine how small a satellite could be built with COTS components and current 
technology to perform the assigned missions.  A comparative analysis was then 
performed to determine how these satellites could be cost effectively launched to orbit.  
A cost estimate was performed to determine the entire life cycle cost for each satellite 
size excluding launch and integration segments.  Using that information, the best satellite 
size was determined. 
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With the continual miniaturization of components, satellite sizes also continue to 
decrease.  Some missions that are currently conducted by larger satellites may now be 
able to be performed by smaller sized satellites.  Table 1 lists the categories of satellites; 
each type is characterized by their overall mass.  Although smaller sized satellites have 
been proposed as a viable tool to perform operations at all orbital regimes, to date these 
smaller satellite types have predominately been operated in Low Earth Orbit (LEO).  
Their practical use to perform certain missions may also extend throughout all orbital 
regimes around earth to include all inclinations and altitudes greater than geostationary 
orbit. 
Category Mass range [kg] 
large satellite >1,000 
medium-sized satellite 500-1,000 
minisatellite 100-500 
microsatellite 10-100  
nanosatellite 1-10 
picosatellite  0.1-1 
femtosatellite <0.1 
Table 1.   Satellite sizes categorized by mass.1 
Few seem to remember that the use of smaller satellites was mandated due to the 
limited carrying capacity of rockets during the beginning of the space race.  In 1994, well 
after rocket technology had matured and was able to deliver large satellites all the way 
out to geostationary orbit, the Naval Research Laboratory built the components, 
manufactured, integrated and then operated the minisatellite Clementine.  At that time 
when “bigger was considered better”, Clementine was built and orbiting the moon within 
22 months.  A timeframe that was unheard of then and still is today.  Not only was the 
                                                 
1 “satellite mass categories sizes.”  12 July 2007.  12 July 2007.  
<http://www.daviddarling.info/encyclopedia/S/satellite_mass_categories.html>. 
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mission successful at mapping the moon, but it also cost the United States Government 
(USG) a fraction of the cost of normal extra-planetary missions which use much larger 
and more expensive spacecraft. 
Clementine is an example of a successful mission that utilized a smaller 
spacecraft to perform the assigned mission successfully at a reasonable cost.  In the 
recent past the Air Force (AF) has funded Experimental Satellite System (XSS) 10 and 
11.  Each experiment was encompassed in a smaller satellite.  Under the AF, the Air 
Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) has run each of these programs to further research 
and to develop technology so that these types of satellites could be used “to conduct 
“proximity operations,” maneuvers around other satellites. Some have said the XSS 
satellites could be used to inspect, service, or attack other satellites.”2  To this extent, it is 
reasonable to assume that smaller satellites are a viable option to perform certain 
missions that are essential to fulfilling US Space Control Requirements. 
One particular mission involves Space Situational Awareness (SSA), “which 
provides the foundation of Space Superiority.”3  The USG currently has no means for 
space object identification that can see what systems and their physical characteristics 
that are stationed in the geostationary belt.  Rumors derived from open source 
publications have stated that China has placed small satellites near satellites that the USG 
considers vital to it national security.  The assumed mission for these small satellites is to 
neutralize the USG’s high value satellites when they are directed.  With current ground 
observing radars and optical systems, the smallest non-mirrored object that can be 
identified by long dwell imaging is greater than one half meter in any dimension.  If the 
USG had a spacecraft that could drift through the geostationary belt, then the USG would 
be able to observe these satellites at a resolution that would not only allow the detection 
of these satellites, but also the ability to classify the satellite’s payload, mission and 
possibly secondary missions. 
                                                 
2 Hui Zhang.  Action/Reaction:  U.S. Space Weaponization and China.  December 2005.  20 
September 2007.  <http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2005_12/Dec-cvr.asp>. 
3 John Brock.  Operational Utility of Small Satellites.  SAB Summer Session, 28 June 2007.  Slide 13. 
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Figure 1 depicts a view from earth that was collected using long dwell imagery 
techniques.  Figure 1 illustrates the problem of identifying smaller objects from earth that 
are in or near the geostationary belt.  The picture was taken over seven hours and forty 
minutes.  In that time the observer was able to collect enough reflected light from the sun 
off of each satellite labeled to be able to clearly identify it.  The imaged captured a 
portion of the geostationary belt beginning with Galaxy 13 stationed at 127.0 degrees 
West Longitude all the way to Galaxy 3C stationed at 95.0 degrees West Longitude.  This 
image captures 11.25 percent of the entire geostationary belt.  Even the objects that are in 
a geosynchronous orbit can be seen as if they are still in the night’s sky.  In the image, 
background stars appear as streaks due to earth rotating about its axis, while the 
geostationary satellites appear clear and distinct.  This photograph was taken with a small 
telescope, utilizing long dwell imagery techniques on a cloudless night.  It shows how 
easy it can be to see large satellites covered in reflective thermal insulation and other 
reflective surfaces.  Although it is easy to image large reflective satellites from earth, 
features of the satellites are not captured.  Knowing satellite positions are very important, 
but determining their capabilities is vital to SSA.  To accomplish this imaging with a fine 
enough resolution to identify satellite components is crucial  
 
Figure 1.   Time delayed photograph of a portion of the geostationary belt as viewed 
from earth with satellites labeled.4 
                                                 
4 David Dolling.  “Earth Science Picture of the Day, Geostationary Satellites.”  9 April 2007.  17 June 
2007.  < http://epod.usra.edu/archive/epodviewer.php3?oid=379872>. 
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If a satellite could drift through the geostationary belt, it could easily observe the 
fine detail of each satellite while relaying its captured image back to its ground 
controllers.  With such information, each object in geostationary orbit could be accurately 
imaged, cataloged and monitored.  No nation, rogue state, or terrorist organization could 
place something into that orbit without the USG knowing about it.  A satellite that drifted 
through the geostationary belt would be the perfect solution to the SSA mission of 
interest. 
A smaller satellite operating in this same manner would also be able to fulfill 
another attractive mission that involves Space Control.  A smaller satellite operating in 
close proximity to geostationary orbit should be able to effectively jam or inject false 
signals into any geostationary communications satellite.  If the smaller satellite could jam 
the communication satellite at a high enough power, it would also have the ability to 
damage sensitive receiver equipment on the communications satellite.  This ability could 
effectively neutralize the targeted satellite’s receiving capability at that frequency band.  
These missions would allow the USG to disrupt, deny, deceive and possibly destroy 
enemy satellite communications relayed or broadcast from geostationary orbit. 
Unfortunately a satellite can not merely drift through the geostationary belt; it 
would have to use considerable propulsion utilizing numerous orbit transfers to move 
about.  A satellite can however pass by the other satellites in the geostationary belt if it 
has an altitude that is slightly lower or higher than 35,776.9 kilometers.  If a satellite is at 
a lower altitude, it will orbit the earth slightly faster than the satellites in the geostationary 
belt, and if the satellite is higher it will orbit the earth slower.  Another way to look at it 
is, that if a satellite is at a lower altitude, then it will seem to overtake the satellites in the 
geostationary belt, whereas a satellite at a higher altitude will appear to be overtaken by 
the geostationary belt satellites.  Of these two choices, the lower altitude is more 
appealing since it will allow a satellite with an optical payload to capture images of the 
targeted satellite’s payloads that are pointing toward the earth at the closest point of 
approach (CPA) between the two satellites.  A sub-geostationary altitude will also allow 
the satellite to capture an image of the target’s side sections with images captured during 
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the approach and departure from the CPA.  With these images, USG personnel will be 
able to accurately characterize each satellite in the geostationary belt. 
One aspect that must be considered is that not all satellites are actually located 
exactly in the geostationary belt; many have drifted into what is referred to as a 
geosynchronous orbit.  This orbit has the same period as the geostationary belt satellites, 
but they do not have an inclination of zero degrees.  To this extent, a single satellite may 
not be able to reach a near enough CPA with these satellites to capture any images at a 
resolution that could be used to characterize these satellites.  Not being able to image 
satellites in geosynchronous orbit may force the design of special orbits for single high 
interest satellites to allow these satellites to be imaged properly. 
If a satellite could be manufactured small enough without jeopardizing the 
function of its payload, then it would likely be undetectable by known, current ground 
based surveillance systems.  To further enhance this capability, the smaller satellite could 
employ techniques such as using low-reflectance materials and onboard Attitude 
Determination and Control System (ADCS) algorithms that will orient the satellite to 
avoid reflecting sunlight back to earth.  Therefore covert use of a smaller satellite such as 
a microsatellite, or even a nanosatellite near geostationary orbit is a very attractive means 
to perform sensitive missions that must be conducted near the geostationary belt.  At a 
relatively low cost to produce, the potential to develop satellites of these sizes is very 
attractive and lends itself to the idea of producing fleets of these vehicles.  The large 
number of smaller satellites per fleet constructed would make up for the assumed lower 
reliability of these satellites and would be less of a concern in the event of a satellite 
failure. 
Smaller satellites could be designed to operate using current USG ground control 
facilities and software.  To further enhance their utility and cost savings; they could be 
made to operate as autonomously as USG officials felt comfortable.  The greater the 
autonomy, the smaller their support workforce would need to be.  These two features 
have the potential to keep the costs much lower for a program that would operate 
utilizing smaller satellites. 
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Opponents to such a deployment of these smaller satellites assert that the satellites 
lack sufficient redundancy to operate for any predictable amount of time on orbit.  They 
also claim that these satellites do not have the capability to perform any mission at the 
standard that is required.  These satellites cannot be hardened sufficiently to prevent 
single event upsets (SEUs) or micro-meteorite impacts.  There is also no standard method 
that is currently utilized to deliver smaller satellites to a near geostationary orbit.  For 
these reasons, many space professionals doubt that these smaller sized satellites will 
actually have a viable operational role at geostationary orbit. 
In this thesis, I will explore through first level spacecraft design and Satellite Tool 
Kit (STK) simulations the viability of smaller satellite operations near geostationary 
orbit.  I will examine the plausibility and practicality of employing a smaller satellite to 
perform various attractive missions at an altitude slightly lower than geostationary orbit.  
I will design a Half-Meter-Cube, a 5U-CubeSat and a 1U CubeSat using Commercial-
Off-The-Shelf (COTS) components to the fullest extent possible.  Each satellite will be 
designed to perform an optical survey mission.  In these designs, I will try to incorporate 
the most capability into each satellite as possible.  After determining the capabilities of 
these satellites, I will use simulations in STK to determine the degree to which these 
missions may be applicable to the capabilities of these satellites.  I will also discuss the 
potential that these types of satellites may have to perform a service denial mission and a 
satellite component neutralization mission targeting geostationary satellites. 
This thesis is theoretical in nature.  Analytical calculations, simulations utilizing 
STK along with an examination of scientific literature, are the main research 
methodologies.  Analysis will be mathematical in nature concentrating on the laws of 
physics.  Once a basic approach has determined if this approach is indeed possible, I will 
continue with a more refined approach to the topic.  Once this approach has confirmed 
that this application is indeed possible, I will approach applicable questions concentrating 
on satellite and constellation properties, CONOPS, financial, and then US moral 
reservations of the possible use of this application.  When discussing these areas I will 
also apply a common sense approach to areas of that study when a purely mathematical 
approach is not possible or too cumbersome to emphasize a point clearly.  I will approach 
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the discussion with the assumption that the reader has a basic understanding of 
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II. PAST SMALLER SATELLITE DESIGNS 
A. CLEMENTINE 
Construction began in 1992 at the Naval Research Laboratory (NRL) on the first 
United States mini-spacecraft, designed to map the moon.  Twenty-two months later, the 
octagonal prism shaped spacecraft was launched.  Clementine measured 1.8 meters in 
height and 1.14 meters in width.  It had a mass of 227 kilograms and a nominal operating 
power of 360 watts.  The mini-spacecraft “mapped 100% of the lunar surface in 11 
spectral bands with greater than 99% coverage.”5  In less than two months, from a lunar 
orbit, Clementine transmitted more than 1.8 million images of the moon’s surface.  
Unfortunately a malfunction caused the spacecraft to prematurely expend the onboard 
fuel supply preventing completion of its secondary mission to pass within 100 kilometers 
of the asteroid Geographos.  Subsequent to the malfunction, the spacecraft was placed 
within the Van Allen radiation belts to test the effects that increased radiation would have 
on the spacecraft’s components.  During the mission, the spacecraft qualified 23 
advanced lightweight technologies for spaceflight. 
Clementine remains one of the shining examples of how a mission can be 
performed faster and inexpensive by a smaller spacecraft if a level of risk is allowed by 
the program’s managers.  In addition to its technical success, the public supported the 
mission and was amazed at the images produced by the spacecraft.  Working with NASA, 
NRL increased the public support for the mission by releasing all imagery of the moon 
obtained by the spacecraft.  To this day, NRL maintain a database of moon imagery 
similar to a Google Earth (TM of Google) that is accessible to the public from NRL’s 
website for Clementine. 
 
 
                                                 
5 J. Schaub.  “Clementine The Deep Space Program Science Experiment Advanced Technology 
Demonstration.”  25 July 2007.  25 July 2007.  <http://code8200.nrl.navy.mil/clementine.html.> 
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B. XSS-10 
The Experimental Satellite System (XSS) program began in 1997 when Boeing 
was awarded the contract under a project funded by the Air Force Research Laboratory 
(AFRL).  XSS-10 was planned as the first in a series of very small satellites that would 
eventually lead to the development of microsatellites used “for inspection, rendezvous, 
and docking and close-up maneuvering around other space objects.”6 This satellite’s 
mission requirements were to when ordered semi-autonomously rendezvous with another 
object in low earth orbit.  During the satellite’s rendezvous and following proximity 
operations it continuously relayed imagery to its ground station through the AFSCN.7  
XSS-10 was the first project to take on such a rendezvous mission with an unmanned 
spacecraft.  The spacecraft’s maximum dimensions were constrained by the excess 
volume and mass available as a secondary payload onboard a Delta II rocket, sharing a 
ride with a Global Positioning System (GPS) satellite. 
To satisfy all mission requirements, XSS-10 had a “lightweight propulsion 
system; guidance, navigation & control (GNC); miniaturized communications system; 
primary lithium polymer batteries; integrated camera and star sensor.”8  Only three years 
after the project began, “Boeing’s Space and Intelligence Systems and Rocketdyne 
Propulsion and Power divisions designed, developed and built the 31-kilogram (68-
pound) spacecraft[.]”9  XSS-10 was integrated into the Delta II launch vehicle in 
September 2001, awaiting a launch date.  The spacecraft was launched on January 29th, 
2003 from Cape Canaveral Air Force Station, Fla. 
After a few hours on orbit the micro-satellite began operations.  Throughout the 
mission the microsatellite streamed live video from an onboard camera to the ground 
                                                 
6 “XSS-10 Micro Satellite”, Fact Sheet.  February 2005.  20 August 2007.  
<http://www.kirtland.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-070404-107.pdf>. 
7 Thomas M. Davis.  “XSS-10 Micro Satellite Flight Demonstration.”  2005 Space Systems 
Engineering Conference.  11 October 2005.  5. 
8 “XSS-10 Micro Satellite”, Fact Sheet.  February 2005.  20 August 2007.  
<http://www.kirtland.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-070404-107.pdf>. 
9 Boeing Demonstrates Capabilities of Micro-Satellite.  Satellite Today.  Potomac: Feb 5, 2003. Vol. 2, 
Iss. 18; 1. 
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control center.  During the first 12-hour test mission, it “traveled within 100 meters (328 
feet) of the second-stage booster of the Delta II rocket to take photographs and transmit 
the images back to ground from a low-Earth orbital position 800 kilometers (497 miles) 
above the equator.”10  During the second 12 hour period of operations, additional 
operations, requiring more demanding maneuver control were attempted, allowing the 
microsatellite to travel closer to its target.  Unfortunately, communications with XSS-10 
were lost while the microsatellite was performing a close survey of its target.  XSS-10 
was later determined that an onboard guidance error caused the spacecraft to collide with 
the Delta II rocket’s second stage ending the spacecraft’s mission. 
XSS-10’s greatest accomplishment was the development of microsatellite 
hardware, software and operations procedures for the autonomous 
inspection of residence space objects.  This included a number of firsts.  
Perhaps the most noteworthy of the operational firsts was demonstration 
of a relative navigation scheme for close-in inspection based on camera-
derived RSO [Resident Space Object] centroid information.11 
XSS-10 mission provided ground breaking technology to build future XSS 
missions upon and the confidence that these types of missions could be performed with 
even smaller satellites.  The success of the project generated excitement in the military 
and aerospace sectors but was met with mixed feelings in the civilian media.  Many 
reports echo this comment made by Bruce DeBlois, “In January 2003, the U.S. Air Force 
demonstrated its XSS-10 microsatellite, which repeatedly maneuvered to within 35 
meters of a target to take photographs. Had it been equipped with a gun instead of a 
camera, it could have destroyed the target.”12  His comments show the way with which 
this mission was viewed by opponents to the weaponization of space.  Even with mixed 
opinions from the public about the relevance of this mission, all concerned parties were 
pleased with the mission’s overall results.  These accomplishments became the 
foundation for the next mission to build upon. 
                                                 
10 Boeing Demonstrates Capabilities of Micro-Satellite.  Satellite Today.  Potomac: Feb 5, 2003. Vol. 
2, Iss. 18; 1. 
11 Thomas M. Davis.  “XSS-10 Micro Satellite Flight Demonstration.”  2005 Space Systems 
Engineering Conference.  11 October 2005.  17. 




In 2001, with the assumed success of XSS-10, AFRL drafted a more ambitious set 
of requirements with a shorter timeline for XSS-11.  This microsatellite would be 
required to conduct rendezvous and close-proximity operations with semi-autonomous 
guidance.  After certain milestones were accomplished the microsatellite would carry out 
its mission with fully autonomy.  Not only was it required to observe its spent launch 
vehicle’s upper stage, but following those operations, it was required to continue through 
its orbit to conduct rendezvous operations with other objects.  At the time, this was 
considered a very difficult task, due to the complexity involved with creating computer 
code to autonomously perform rendezvous and proximity missions.  To complete these 
requirements the microsatellite required a propulsion system with enough propellant to 
change orbital altitude and planes around LEO.  The maneuvers required the spacecraft to 
be slightly larger than its predecessor, but still remain in the microsatellite category.  The 
design and construction had to be accomplished in less than four years with a 21 million 
dollar budget for the microsatellite.  In August 2001, the contract was awarded to 
Lockheed-Martin and a dedicated Minotaur-1 launch vehicle was selected to launch the 
microsatellite out of Vandenberg Air Force base in California. 
Before the satellite was even launched the media proposed the actions 
surreptitious purpose of XSS-11; 
designed for "rendezvous and proximity operations"—that is, meeting 
with other satellites to perform inspections, maintenance, and the like. 
However, as an unnamed U.S. defense official candidly acknowledged in 
an interview with Inside the Pentagon in December 2003, the XSS-11 
could also be used as an antisatellite weapon.13 
Comments critical of the mission were common place throughout the satellite’s 
development and even still to this day. 
The microsatellite was launched on April 11, 2005.  After separating from its 
Minotaur launch vehicle, XSS-11 began its mission.  Within the first few hours, it 
                                                 
13 Bruce DeBlois.  IEEE Spectrum Star-Crossed.  June 2004.  18 September.  
<http://www.spectrum.ieee.org/print/1585>. 
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successfully rendezvoused and began proximity operations about the Minotaur I upper 
stage.  “As of fall 2005, it has accomplished more than 75 natural motion 
circumnavigations of the expended launch vehicle.  During its projected 12 to 18-month 
flight, the spacecraft will conduct rendezvous and proximity maneuvers with several US-
owned, dead or inactive resident space objects near its orbit, as well as will exhibit more 
autonomy as the project continues.”14  These projected operations were successfully 
accomplished.  As of fall 2006, the satellite had rendezvoused with at least three other 
orbiting objects before the mission was terminated due to re-entry fuel requirements. 
After the mission was deemed successful, public debate intensified over the use of 
such technology, due to its potential use as a co-orbital anti-satellite.  The following 
excerpt is from a citation that typifies the sediment between the military and public 
opinion: 
But that short preparation time and zero-g agility also could make the 
microsatellites ideal weapons for disabling other countries' orbiters, note 
Pentagon space critics, including Theresa Kitchens, vice president of the 
Center for Defense Information. XSS-11's predecessor was an 
experimental missile defense satellite called Clementine 2. "That history 
makes me suspicious," Hitchens says. In the 2004 report titled 
"Counterspace Operations," the Air Force declared that the "freedom to 
attack, denying space capability to the adversary" has become a "crucial 
first step in any military operation." The Defense Department plans to 
spend about $10 million over four years to develop small satellite 
payloads that could take out other orbiters.  The Air Force says the XSS-
11 itself "is not a weapon and it has no military mission or application." 
Hitchens agrees that the "current experiments are benign." It's the future 
potential of the mini sat that has caught her attention. To which [Harold] 
Baker [XSS-11 program manager at the Air Force Research Lab] replies, 
"Name me a technology that can't be used for the military somehow.15 
As the citation suggests, XSS-11 demonstrated capabilities that have elevated the 
interest of those resistant to the USG’s Space Control program.  However, all rendezvous 
and servicing capabilities are readily extended to space control missions. 
                                                 
14 “XSS-11 Micro Satellite”, Fact Sheet.  December 2005.  20 August 2007.  
<http://www.kirtland.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-070404-108.pdf>. 
15 Noah Shachtman.  “Smaller, Smarter Satellites Spark Debate.”  Popular Mechanics. New York:  Jul 
2005.  Vol. 182, Iss. 7; 29. 
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As of January 2006, the total budget for the project topped 80 million dollars 
including the launch vehicle and the cost to operate the microsatellite.  The experiment 
successfully met all requirements and validated technology which enables autonomous 
rendezvous and close proximity operations between objects orbiting earth.  From the 
successful results of this experiment, I will assume this same technology will allow 
satellites to perform similar maneuvers in geostationary orbit. 
D. ORBITAL EXPRESS 
The Orbital Express (OE) mission was a joint effort between the Defense 
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), NASA and the Air Force.  The 
program’s mission was to demonstrate autonomous satellite servicing techniques between 
two cooperative spacecraft operating in LEO.  To accomplish this mission the program 
kicked off in 1999 and was able to gather lessons learned from XSS-10, XSS-11 and 
NASA’a failed Demonstration of Autonomous Rendezvous Technology (DART) 
mission. 
The program began in 1999 by investigating “robotic technologies enabling the 
on-orbit upgrade of electronics and refueling and reconfiguration of satellites, both 
military and commercial at low and high orbits.”16  By the end of 2000 OE had gained 
enough momentum to fund technology demonstrations by many leading aerospace 
developers.  By the end of summer of 2001, “Spectrum Astro, BAE Systems and Boeing 
each received contracts worth about $6 million for the first phase, the study and analysis 
period, of the Orbital Express program.”17  In March 2002, DARPA awarded Boeing the 
99 million dollar contract to complete the second phase of the program building the 
Autonomous Space Transport Robotic Operations (Astro) and NextSAT.  Boeing then 
choose to partner with Ball Aerospace; Northrop Grumman Space Technology; 
MacDonald, Dettwiler and Associates; Charles Stark Draper Laboratory; and Starsys 
Research to built and integrate the satellites for the program.  On April 4th, 2006, Boeing 
                                                 
16 Bryan Bender. “DARPA kickstarts R&D on sensors, space robotics.” Jane's Defence Weekly. 
Horley: Nov 10, 1999. Vol. 032, Iss. 019, 1 
17 Robert Wall. “Darpa Pursues Refueling, Electronic Upgrades for Sats.” Aviation Week & Space 
Technology. New York: May 14, 2001. Vol. 154, Iss. 20, 80. 
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announced that it had completed the autonomous rendezvous and docking milestones 
through laboratory based testing.  Later that year, Ball Aerospace delivered NextSAT to 
Boeing for final testing and integration.  By the end of 2006, Boeing was involved in the 
integration of the OE mission stack into the ATLAS V 401 expendable launch vehicle 
being utilized for the Space Test Program One (STP-1) launch.  The OE mission was 
launched on March 8th, 2007 out of the Cape Canaveral Air Force Station in Florida. 
As soon as OE was delivered to orbit it ran into problems.  One of the reaction 
wheels in Astro was coded in the opposite direction than the geometry used for the 
spacecraft’s ADCS.  This caused Astro to steer it body in an orientation that was away 
from the sun.  Over two progressive orbits the Boeing team frantically tried to figure out 
the problem, to no avail.  The Ball Aerospace team was then allowed to try to steer the 
entire stack with NextSAT’s reaction wheels although the reaction wheels were sized to 
control that spacecraft alone, not the entire “stack”.  To the relief of the program’s 
members, NextSAT was able to properly orient the “stack” so that both NextSAT and 
Astro could charge their batteries allowing the mission to continue.  The coding error was 
identified and corrected a few weeks later.  With both satellites performing properly the 
stack was separated on May 5th, beginning the OE mission. 
[The mission] went on to conduct numerous automated rendezvous and 
docking maneuvers using a three-fingered capture mechanism and a 
relative navigation system consisting of infrared and optical cameras 
keying off retro-reflector targets on NextSAT.  During the mission, the 
two spacecraft also demonstrated component swapping in which a robotic 
arm on Astro built by MacDonald, Dettwiler and Associates Ltd. of 
Canada passed a battery capable of powering NextSAT back and forth 
between similar bays on the two spacecraft. They demonstrated over a 
dozen autonomous transfers of hydrazine monopropellant as well.18 
On May 28 the second anomaly of the mission occurred when a single event upset 
(SEU) caused the navigation system onboard NextSAT to shut down during a maneuver 
that was supposed to place the spacecraft no more than 30 meters from Astro.  Instead 
                                                 
18 Jefferson Morrison.  “Full Service: Pioneering Orbital Express Offers Lessons for Satellite 
Servicing; Pioneering Orbital Express mission offers many lessons for future satellite servicing”.  Aviation 
Week & Space Technology. New York: Jul 23, 2007. Vol. 167, Iss. 4, 57. 
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NextSAT drifted out to six kilometers from Astro when ground operators were able to 
return the spacecraft to normal operations.  With the help of NASA expertise derived 
from Gemini and Apollo missions, NextSAT was bought back to Astro and successfully 
mated.  Following the error, the program halted rendezvous operations while the cause of 
NextSAT’s guidance failure was identified and remedy procedures were drafted that 
could be used incase of a future failure. 
Operations re-commenced on June 22nd.  After the unexpected six kilometer 
rendezvous, the OE mission validated its 30 meter and 100 meter rendezvous 
requirements and proceeded to chase more ambitious program goals.  OE completed the 
first successful autonomous capture of another spacecraft with a robotic arm by an 
unmanned spacecraft.  The mission completed autonomous rendezvous and docking 
procedures from distances ranging from a few meters out to seven kilometers. 
With the mission’s final demonstrations complete, the program completed all of 
the mission objectives and set a new standard for other programs.  The OE mission cost 
“$267-million mission--to which Boeing is adding substantial in-house funding”19  The 
technology created and then demonstrated by OE should be able to incorporated into 
smaller spacecraft and satellites with further miniaturization of electronics and solid state 
avionics. 
E. CUBESAT 
The CubeSat configuration is a cube-shaped, stackable spacecraft structure, 10-
cm on a side.  This configuration is credited to Bob Twiggs at Stanford University and 
has been implemented in the educational and research programs of a number of 
universities and government agencies throughout the world.  The California Polytechnic 
State University (Cal Poly) and Stanford University are leading a collaboration of 40 
universities, high schools, and private firms as part of an international CubeSat  
 
                                                 
19 Michael A. Taverna. “Rethinking Recovery: Europe Cools to On-Orbit Servicing; Despite looming 
Orbital Express launch, Europe backs off from on-orbit servicing.” Aviation Week & Space Technology. 
New York: Feb 19, 2007. Vol. 166, Iss. 8, 60 
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partnership.  These two universities have developed a group facilitated by the Internet 
and bi-annual conferences, accelerating technology development, enhancing CubeSat 
capabilities. 
This class of satellite is designed primarily for space development education.  
CubeSats are cubical in shape, ten centimeters in each dimension.  They can also be 
stacked into configurations that maintain two dimensions of ten centimeters and the third 
dimension is increased in multiples of ten, up to 50 centimeters.  A 1U-CubeSat is ten 
centimeters in all dimensions, while a 3U-CubeSat is 30 centimeters in one dimension 
and ten centimeters in the other two dimensions.  This size variation allows the CubeSat 
standard to be much more useful and appropriate to a much wider variety of missions.  
With this standard in place, vendors are able to build components that are specifically 
designed to be utilized in CubeSats.  Pumpkin Incorporated and Clyde Space are leading 
developers of COTS equipment specifically designed for use in CubeSats. 
Various methods have been used to deploy CubeSats from launch vehicles.  The 
most popular method is the Poly Picosatellite Orbital Deployer (P-POD), developed and 
manufactured by Cal Poly.  A P-POD can carry and dispense 3U-worth of CubeSats.  The 
3U of CubeSats can be in the form of three 1U-CubeSats, a 2U-CubeSat and a 1U-
CubeSat or a single 3U-CubeSat.  The P-POD has been used to deploy CubeSats in LEO, 
but there is no reason why it would not be able to operate properly at any orbital altitude.  
Cal Poly is currently working to develop and construct an extended P-POD that will have 
the capability to deploy 5U-worth of CubeSats. 
CubeSats can be designed to perform various types of missions.  CubeSat 
developers are currently concentrating on space education and technology demonstration.  
Standardized COTS hardware and software can be purchased which helps educational 
institutions to build these satellites.  In addition to satellite components, COTS ground 
station hardware and software are also available.  With a marginal amount of effort, low 
tech CubeSats can be built and their ground stations erected.  The only difficulty CubeSat 




CubeSat payloads are ham radio transponders, radio frequency beacons, and space 
science experiments.  Industry is beginning to build and launch CubeSats to demonstrate 
their technology capabilities. 
Most notable, Aerospace Corporation has launched two 1U-CubeSats in the past 
two years.  Their CubeSat development lab has designed, built and operated each 
CubeSat since its establishment in 2000.  Desiring a short turn around, the developers 
concentrated on using COTS equipment that suited their requirements.  When this 
equipment was not available, they developed the miniaturized components themselves.  
Their designs concentrate on ease of construction and reproducibility.  With these 
guiding principles, Aerospace has been able to take great steps which will facilitate the 
CubeSat standard to become immediately useful. 
AeroCube-2 was launched out of a P-Pod onboard a Russian Dnepr rocket on 
April 17, 2007.  “That CubeSat was constructed in-house using equipment created by 
Aerospace and their standard providers.”20  Significantly innovative equipment aboard 
AeroCube-2 were a patch type antenna, five cameras and an inflatable balloon (for de-
orbiting).  In addition, the satellite used a passive thermal control system that utilized 
satellite thermal coatings to trap enough heat to allow the satellite to operate at optimum 
temperatures without the use of heaters.  Each C328-7640 JPEG Compression VGA 
Module (cameras utilized) was positioned to view out of a single face of the satellite.  
Positioning the cameras on each face enabled the satellite to take pictures in five of six 
directions, giving the satellite the ability to take at least one picture of its intended target 
80 percent of the time as it free tumbled in its orbit.  The deployable balloon was 
mounted on the remaining open surface.  The balloon would have inflated via an 
electrically operated valve that could have filled it using the cold gas stored onboard the 
nanosatellite.  However, due to a power system design problem, the valve was never 
actuated and the balloon could not be inflated. 
Even with the EPS failure the mission was still a success.  AeroCube-2 validated 
the patch strip antenna design, which gave the satellite spherical coverage with the 
                                                 
20 David A. Hinkley.  “Teleconference between David A. Hinkley and Matthew T. Erdner” 6 August 
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exception of one axis which effectively reduced the complete coverage area by only 10 
percent.  This antenna and its transceiver allowed AeroCube-2 to transmit data at about 
100k baud.  This is compared to the nominal 18k baud limitation of most CubeSat, when 
developers utilize dipole type antennae on their CubeSats. 
Aerospace is planning to build on the success of AeroCube-2 with another 1U-
CubeSat, AeroCube-3, which they plan to launch in the spring of 2008.  Aerospace’s 
differential GPS unit is on schedule to be completed by October 2007.  When they 
complete this component, it will be the first at a small enough size that can deliver the 
velocity rates that CubeSat needs to determine it’s own position.  They also have their 
eyes set on the largest engineer challenge milestone of CubeSats, attitude control.  “The 
holy grail of 1U-CubeSat development is reliable 3-axis stabilization.  Once we have that, 
the sky is the limit for the 1U-CubeSat’s usefulness.”21  Aerospace is currently 
attempting attitude control by incorporating an electromagnetic coil for north and south 
attitude control and a single modified Maxon motor for attitude control normal to the 
north-south plane.  In addition to these milestones, AeroCube-3 will also possess 
deployable solar arrays and a balloon for de-orbit that will be inflated by sublimation. 
Aerospace is enthusiastically leading the way together with other organizations to 
make the 1U-CubeSat a viable satellite standard that may have a powerful role beyond 
education and technology demonstration. CubeSat capabilities will always be limited to 
their overall dimensions but through the continual miniaturization of components, the 
usefulness for CubeSats will be realized allowing them to formation flying, form sparse 
apertures and execute other inventive implementations. 
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III. DISCUSSION OF GEOSTATIONARY ORBIT  
A. GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF GEOSTATIONARY ORBIT 
Geostationary orbit is located along the plane extending out from earth’s center to 
through the equator to an altitude of 35776.9 kilometers above mean earth sea level.  At 
this altitude, a satellite that has an inclination of zero degrees appears to hover directly 
over that geographical longitude along earth’s equator.  This is the uniquely 
advantageous altitude that allows the satellite to travel at the same velocity at which the 
earth revolves about its own axis.  The geostationary orbit is commonly referred to as a 
Clarke orbit due to his proclamation in the mid 1940’s that only three satellites in this 
type of orbit would be necessary to provide worldwide communications. 
In 1964, Syncom became the first communications satellite to be placed in 
geostationary orbit.  Since that time, the slots in this orbital regime have become 
extremely sought after by all countries that are capable of deploying their own or 
purchasing satellites to operate in this region of space.  The missions for geostationary 
satellites have commonly fallen under three categories.  The first mission is 
telecommunications; the second is ISR (Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance. 
B. DISCUSSION OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS AT 
GEOSTATIONARY ORBIT 
Any satellite placed into geostationary orbit must be able to withstand a very 
harsh environment.  The most concerning factor to affect satellites operating at this orbit 
are the radiation and charged particles primarily released by the Sun.  Solar weather 
directly factors in the mission lifetime and operation of a satellite located at geostationary 
orbit.  The magnetopause is “the boundary between the region dominated by the 
geomagnetic field on one side and the region dominated by the solar wind plasma 
pressure on the other.”22  This region effectively rejects a large amount of the energetic 
                                                 
22 Richard C. Olsen.  Introduction to Space Environment.  Monterey:  Naval Postgraduate School.  
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particles released by the sun.  If a solar flare occurs pointing in the direction of earth, then 
the earth’s magnetopause could be pushed closer to earth.  In this event, the area of the 
magnetopause that is between the earth and the Sun will be forced to move toward the 
earth a distance that will balance out with the force being applied from it by the energetic 
particles and solar wind released by the Sun.  Within micro-seconds the satellite will pass 
through the new boundary of earth’s magnetopause and into a region that has no 
protection from the sun’s radiation.  When this occurs the satellite is exposed to 
significantly larger amounts of energetic particles and electromagnetic radiation than 
normal.  These particles can induce single event upsets (SEUs), into computer systems 
and even permanently damage equipment.  Depending on the solar cycle, solar weather 
will be properly characterized and modeled to allow satellite designers and operators to 
anticipate what type of environment their satellite will operate in during its mission 
lifetime.  With the analysis conducted, satellites designers balance risk and cost to design 
each satellite enough hardening and redundant components so that it will most likely 
operate throughout its mission design life (MDL). 
For these reasons a satellite designer must robustly design satellites to withstand 
these environmental conditions.  The satellite’s design will nominally include enough 
margin to account for exceptionally bad solar weather periods and unexpected solar 
weather events such as large magnitude solar flares. 
C. IMPORTANCE OF GEOSTATIONARY ORBIT 
Geostationary orbit is the only type of orbit that allows a satellite to continually 
linger over one single location of the earth, providing the user the ability for continual 
access to a geographical location of interest, as long as that area is in the footprint of the 
satellite.  A communications satellite operating in a geostationary orbit can provide 
continuous communications between areas in its coverage zone, which is also referred to 
a satellite’s footprint.  A communications satellite that is operating at an altitude which is 
greater than or less than 35776.9 kilometers cannot provide continuous coverage to one 
geographical area since the satellite is orbiting about earth at a rate that is either faster or  
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slower than the earth rotates about its own axis respectively.  This property of 
geostationary orbit gives it the persistence that is required for effective communications 
and weather observations. 
D. RESTRICTIONS OF GEOSTATIONARY ORBIT 
One of the major drawbacks to geostationary orbit is that due to the curvature of 
the earth’s surface, satellites in this orbit will not have global access.  A geostationary 
satellite’s coverage zone will extend approximately from 60 degrees south to 60 degrees 
north latitude along the line of longitude in which the satellite is stationed.  Therefore the 
satellite will never have access to the polar regions of the earth, unless the satellite’s 
inclination is greater than five degrees, and then it is no longer in a true geostationary 
orbit, but a geosynchronous orbit.  The capability of a satellite’s sensors will determine 
its exact coverage area, but it will certainly not have access to earth’s Polar regions. 
Missions requiring true global access will depend upon augmentation for 
geostationary satellites.  Satellites must operate in other orbits to provide access to these 
Polar regions.  Unfortunately, there is no single orbital plane that will allow a satellite 
constellation to possess continuous global access. 
Along with these coverage restrictions, there are also other perturbations effects 
that cause a satellite to change its orbital properties.  These perturbations will cause a 
satellite to appear to wobble as well as change position, altitude or inclination.  The major 
factors that contribute to these effects are the earth’s non-spherical shape, the gravity of 
the moon, the Sun’s gravity and other factors at geostationary orbit that are minor, yet 
accumulate with time.  Some of these factors are more or less severe depending on a 
satellite’s size. They must be considered and accounted for so a satellites propulsion 
system and ADCS can be sized properly to allow it to fully perform its assigned mission 




These factors will cause a satellite that was once operating in geostationary orbit 
to now operate in a geosynchronous orbit.  For this reason, the scope of this thesis will 
also include satellites that are operating in what is referred to as near geostationary orbit.  
The orbital period for these satellites is still near to one sidereal day and their inclination 
is less than five degrees. 
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IV. COMMON MISSIONS PERFORMED BY GEOSTATIONARY 
SATELLITES 
A. COMMUNICATIONS 
From the time Arthur C. Clarke completed his calculations to determine the 
geostationary altitude, telecommunications system designers dreamed of placing three 
satellites at this altitude to deliver telecommunications worldwide. 
Telecommunications is the primary mission of nearly 95 percent23 of all 
operational geostationary satellites.  Geostationary altitude provides the perfect orbit to 
deliver constant communications to every user in the satellite’s stationary footprint.  
Transmitters and receivers alike should never have to be re-adjusted to continue to 
communicate with the satellite.  Whereas ground stations that communicate with 
satellites operating at any other orbital altitude must continually track the satellite to 
communicate with it during each satellite pass.  The passes can last a few minutes for a 
LEO satellite and up to several hours for a satellite positioned in a Molniya orbit.  
Regardless of pass duration, no other orbital regime will allow satellites to have 
continuous access to the same geographical region.  Telecommunications is truly is an 
ideal mission to be performed by geostationary satellites. 
B. ISR 
Long dwell operations and persistent access to a geographical area by a single 
satellite is only possible if it is positioned at geostationary altitude.  For these reasons low 
resolution optical imaging and non-imaging missions and Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) 
can be conducted at geostationary orbit. 
Low resolution imagery missions are continuously conducted at geostationary 
orbit by weather satellites of various nations.  These imaging satellites are perfectly 
suited to be stationed at geostationary orbit.  Once imaging satellites are placed over a 
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geographic area they provide reliable imagery of the weather occurring in that region 
earth’s atmosphere.  They provide access to areas such as the world’s oceans that are 
impractical to monitor in any other way.  It would take fleets of ships or aircraft operating 
continuously equally spaced throughout our world’s oceans to deliver similar weather 
products that a few weather satellites operating at geostationary orbit are able to provide.  
Severe weather forecasts are created from geostationary weather satellite products that 
account for thousands of lives and tens of millions of dollars saved each year, by 
providing accurate forecasts to allow areas to be evacuated before severe weather strikes.  
The economies of the world benefit from accurate day to day weather forecasts which 
allow people across the world to effectively plan their days. 24 
The first Defense Support Program (DSP) satellite was delivered to geostationary 
orbit in 1970 for launch warning of Russian intercontinental ballistic missiles. 
DSP satellites have provided an uninterrupted space-based early warning 
capability.  The original DSP satellite weighed 2,000 pounds and had 400 
watts of power, 2,000 detectors and a design life of 1.25 years.  
Throughout the life of the program, the satellite has undergone numerous 
improvements to enhance reliability and capability.  The weight grew to 
5,250 pounds, the power to 1,275 watts, the number of detectors increased 
three-fold to 6,000 and the design life has been increased to a goal of five 
years.25 
The constellation relies on Non-Imaging Infrared (NI-IR) sensors to detect heat 
plumes against the earth’s background temperature.  This sensor allows detection of 
intercontinental ballistic missile launches, jet aircraft operating in after-burner and other 
objects that are above the cloud layer which are much hotter than their surrounding 
environment.  Additionally, the relative protection offered by the orbit’s sheer altitude is 
very attractive for defending US national assets.  DSP’s follow-on program, the Space 
Based Infrared System (SBIRS) has been delayed by several years, and is currently 
expected to start populating geostationary orbit by 2010. 
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Research is currently underway to develop a visual optical system that will have 
the ability to obtain higher resolution imagery from geostationary orbit.  An imaging 
system with continuous access to specified geographical locations and attaining a ground 
resolution of one meter or less would be invaluable to the USG’s intelligence agencies 
and the DoD.  Limitations of current technology are the hurdle to overcome for a high 
resolution geostationary imaging satellite.  This application has been a goal for engineers 
since the first geostationary satellite was considered.  To obtain one meter ground 
resolution, an imaging payload must have a focal length of 429 meters and an aperture 
diameter of 38 meters which will only allow the optical system to have an F number of 
eleven26.  Satellites such as the James Webb telescope offer promising designs, and 
potential capabilities for use at geostationary orbit.  Unfortunately no materials in the 
dimensions required have been identified that can handle the thermal stresses at 
geostationary orbit due to earth’s own albedo to remain rigid enough to deliver a constant 
image.  This problem is unlikely to be solved for several decades. 
Due to the properties of geostationary orbit, uncooperative communications is an 
ideal operation to be performed.  Uncooperative communications is commonly referred to 
as SIGINT.  A satellite that hovers over a same geographical area would have the ability 
to continuously monitor any region of that area.  Persistent surveillance could be 
accomplished without an adversary being able to avoid it.  Even if the satellite was 
identified and known to be conducting SIGINT missions, an adversary would never know 
where in its footprint the satellite was listening.  Utilizing a geostationary satellite could 
be the perfect way to accomplish a SIGINT mission. 
To perform a SIGINT mission successfully difficulties must be overcome.  The 
satellite must have a very highly tuned receiver system that was able to operate over a 
several bands of interest.  It would need a large enough antenna so it could receive the 
signals of interest.  To maximize the gain, the antenna would have to be very finely  
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tuned.  Since telecommunications is routinely accomplished at geostationary orbit, it is 
reasonable to assume that uncooperative communications can also be performed at this 
orbit. 
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V. PROPOSED MISSIONS TO BE PERFORMED NEAR 
GEOSTATIONARY ORBIT BY SMALLER SATELLITES 
A. SURVEY MISSIONS 
If the US wishes to enjoy the advantages of space-enabled 
communications, navigation, precision timing, weather, and ISR in any 
potential conflict with China, the National Security Space community 
should aggressively pursue methods to defend its systems from attack.  
First and foremost, the Air Force, as Defense Department executive agent 
for space must develop better Space Situation Awareness (SSA), both in 
breadth and depth.  In breadth, the Air Force should build and maintain an 
improved catalog of objects from low-Earth to geosynchronous orbits. The 
catalog must not only be complete, capturing increasingly smaller objects; 
it needs also to be timely to ensure maneuvering vehicles are discovered in 
time to permit defensive action. In depth, America should develop the 
capacity to better characterize the nature and capabilities of known 
satellites. The US must improve its ability to identify the existence, origin, 
and nature of attacks on its space assets differentiating these attacks from 
system or environmental anomalies. The need for depth and breadth in 
SSA extends to ground-based counterspace systems that might be 
employed against friendly forces. Passive and active defensive systems 
should follow and leverage SSA improvements to "close the loop" on 
American vulnerabilities. America stands a better chance of deterring 
aggression against its critical onorbit assets if it possesses the capability to 
recognize emerging threats, capture timely indications and warnings, and 
respond (defensively or offensively) when attacked. To do otherwise 
presents an inviting vulnerability to an adversary seeking unconventional 
means to neutralize or defeat a stronger foe.27 
The optical survey mission of satellites operating in geostationary orbit will allow 
this important gap in SSA to be filled. 
Due to aperture size constraints, satellites at geostationary orbit can only be 
observed at a desirable resolution from an orbit that is less than 100 kilometers from their 
location.  Even a satellite such as the Hubble Space Telescope with an aperture the size of 
2.4 meters with a focal length of 57.6 meters can only observe a geostationary satellite 
                                                 
27 Martin E.B. France and Richard J, Adams.  “The Chinese Threat to US Superiority”  High Frontier 
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from about 1200 kilometers away to obtain a 20 centimeter resolution.  That may sound 
like a large distance, but it is truly small when compared to a geostationary satellite’s 
altitude above earth’s mean sea level of 35,780 kilometers.  The maximum range for a 
Hubble-like optical imaging payload is only 3.3 percent of the altitude of a geostationary 
orbit.  Even a satellite that costs slightly more than two billion dollars28 to construct and 
launch would still have to be placed into an orbit that was relatively close to 
geostationary orbit so that it could observe geostationary satellites with a spatial 
resolution of 20 centimeters.  Clearly this is not a feasible option from a monetary aspect, 
but designing smaller satellites that are much less expensive to operate near geostationary 
orbit to perform this mission may be feasible.  If they could be built small enough to 
remain undetectable by earth based detection systems, then no one else would know they 
were operating there so they would not create or use techniques to prevent their actions. 
B. SERVICE DENIAL 
In an increasingly technological environment, all modern militaries are more 
dependant upon communications, particularly satellite based communications as they are 
widely used due to their continuous geographical access.  A powerful military capability, 
and a space control mission, is to be able to deny an enemy the use of their geostationary 
satellite telecommunications. 
With a constellation of controlled smaller satellites, a military commander or 
governmental operative could deny the use of these communications as desired, using a 
smaller satellite.  Currently earth based satellite observation systems have a “limiting 
magnitude of about 17.5, equivalent to a size detection threshold of about 0.6 m[eters] in 
GEO”29 for cooperative objects using an integration time of approximately 20 seconds.  
Sizing the satellites below the half meter detectable threshold and the use of non-
reflectant camouflage insulating materials would allow these satellites to possess a 
magnitude less than 17.5 as viewed from earth.  With a relative magnitude less than that 
                                                 
28 “Hubble Space Telescope”.  4 January 2007.  14 September, 2007.  
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threshold, the satellites would be invisible to ground based optical and radar systems.  
This would allow their existence to be undetectable and thus deniable.  To ensure that 
their effects are truly deniable, jamming payloads need to be designed to jam their targets 
without damaging the targeted satellite’s communications equipment.  With no 
permanent effects left on the targeted satellite, the operators of the jammed satellite 
would have no proof that they had been jammed.  More likely, they would conclude that 
some environmental effect or temporary component failure was most likely the cause of 
the targeted satellite’s communications outage. 
A constellation of smaller satellites carrying jamming payloads would have the 
ability to jam communications of our enemies at will.  Or would it…mission success is a 
bit more difficult than it may seem. 
Several difficulties must be overcome to field a jamming satellite constellation.  
The active transmitting payload must be configured to jam the target satellite’s 
communication package.  At a minimum, the jamming electromagnetic radiation must 
match the target’s operating frequency.  A jammer will be more effective and require less 
transmit power if it can also match the modulation and polarization overpower the 
target’s signal to noise (S/N) ratio.  This is a simple process if you are designing a custom 
payload for a certain target communications satellite, but not if you are trying to design a 
payload that can jam every type of communications satellite that is currently operating at 
or near geostationary orbit or at least a large percentage of them.  Should the jamming 
satellite target the uplink or downlink portion of the signal that is traveling to and from 
the satellite?  In that respect, due to propagation path loss it is reasonable to assume that 
you can jam signals that are traveling to the target satellite not from it. 
The only advantage that a small satellite really possesses is that it is positioned 
less than 100 kilometers from the target satellite, whereas the earth based terminals 
(ground, ship or air based) are positioned over 35,780 kilometers away.  The propagation 
loss for the small jamming satellite alone will allow a few watts of transmitted power to 
overcome the milli to pico-watts of power the targeted satellite’s communication system 
is designed to receive if it is delivered into the main beam of the satellite’s receiver 
antenna.  More than a few watts of power will be needed if the jamming signal will be 
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able to overcome the targeted signal through a side lobe or even a back lobe.  The 
increase in power will depend on which lobe is targeted.  The jamming satellite will 
either need to have the ability to jam in any of these lobes or be optimized to jam in the 
main lobe of the targeted satellite’s receive antenna.  If the satellite goal remains to jam 
while not destroying fragile components in the targeted satellite’s receiving equipment 
such as low-noise amplifiers (LNAs), then it must be able to determine the position it is 
to the targeted satellite, know the satellite’s receiver antenna properties so it can 
autonomously determine the power at which it must transmit and the direction it must 
point the jamming energy.  These factors lead to greater complexity, which is one thing 
that must be avoided if these smaller satellites are to remain relatively affordable.  With 
these considerations, the most reasonable approach is to design the system to jam only in 
the targeted satellite’s receive antenna’s main lobe.  Utilizing the gain of the targeted 
satellite’s main lobe will allow the jamming satellite to effectively overcome the target’s 
S/N while guaranteeing not to permanently damage the target. 
Another consideration is the relative position of the optimized jamming satellite 
to the target satellites’ communications antenna’s boresight.  If the jamming satellite is 
more than 30 degrees off of the target satellite’s boresight, then it is very unlikely 
considering finely tuned parabolic antennae that the jamming energy will be able to 
overcome the signal energy the target is trying to receive.  All of these factors make it 
very difficult to design a jamming satellite that can perform these tasks properly without 
destroying components on the targeted communications satellite. 
Common operating frequencies for satellites communication span a range of “2-
GHz to 18-GHz”30, or from S-Band to Ku Band.  This is a huge range over which a 
single oscillator could not adequately be used to reproduce jamming signals.  This 
capability would require a very complex radio that had several oscillators that could be 
selected and then used to accurately generate the frequency at which the targeted satellite 
is receiving.  There are no COTS units that can cover a frequency range of this size.  
Most units cover a portion of a band, such as S-band or X-band.  These constraints drive 
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a requirement that the jamming payload must be comprised of several radios and a 
controlling unit that has the ability to select between these radios and control them 
individually.  The other option is to have a custom radio developed and built for these 
jamming satellites which is not an attractive option.  This would require a one-off type 
unit to be manufactured to suit the needs of a single satellite.  There would likely be no 
commercial utility to sell this kind of a radio.  Without that motivation, the component 
manufacturer would likely require the satellite develop to pay for the research and 
develop of the radio and then also pay for each unit that was needed for the project.  This 
type of situation would be very costly to the program.  Any perceived cost savings to the 
program through utilizing COTS equipment would vanish. 
To complicate this matter further, not only does a jamming satellite’s payload 
need to address different operating frequencies and modulation schemes but the jamming 
satellite must also address different antenna types that potential target telecommunication 
satellites are operating.  The most common type of antenna is the parabolic reflector dish 
type, but others are various horn types, phased arrays, patch arrays, Yagi-Uda, log-
periodic and helical to mention a few.  Each type of antenna possesses its unique 
radiation characteristics, likely operating frequencies and operating EIRP levels.  Effort 
to gain access to the main beam of an antenna of one type will be completely different to 
another antenna type. 
Dealing with a wide range of targeted satellite systems and positioning the 
jamming satellite inside of the target’s main beam represent a very complicated problem 
that a large satellite would struggle to meet.  It is completely unreasonable to believe that 
any small satellite could perform this mission and remain relatively inexpensive while 
measuring less than a half meter in width, length and height. 
This jamming mission could be accomplished by a smaller satellite if it is 
assigned to jam only a specific telecommunications satellite.  The payload could then be 
designed to jam either the TT&C or the operating band of the target satellite.  It is 
common practice for satellites to transmit and receive their TT&C on their operating 
band, and use the designated TT&C band only as a back-up after launch.  Therefore it 
makes most sense to target the operating band.  Knowing the antenna type and most 
 34
likely its operating power, the jammer’s payload can easily be sized so that it transmits at 
a power that will accomplish its mission without damaging components on the targeted 
satellite. 
Disregarding spread spectrum, frequency hopping and other jam prevention 
techniques that are currently employed by most military communications satellites, it 
may be possible to jam a target commercial communication satellite of interest not 
employing these techniques.  With the jamming satellite designed perfectly, there 
remains a problem of orbit selection, which will determine that amount of time available 
for the satellite to effectively jam its target.  The closer to the target the jamming payload 
is placed; the longer it will be in the target’s boresight to effectively jam it.  Placing a 
satellite at a lower altitude also has a disadvantage of a large time to re-visit the targeted 
satellite.  A satellite that is placed at 20 kilometers sub geostationary orbit will take 
approximately eight years to circumnavigate the geostationary belt, while a satellite 
placed at 70 kilometers sub-geostationary orbit will take three years.  This means that a 
jamming satellite that is targeting a single satellite will reasonably only be able to 
perform its mission once. 
The solutions to this problem are not very attractive for a smaller satellite.  One 
option is to place a thruster system on the satellite to allow it to stay inside of its target’s 
main lobe for a longer period.  Adding a thruster will greatly increase the size of the 
satellite and detract from the payloads performance if it’s even possible to design a small 
satellite of the desired dimensions to perform this task with a large propulsion system.  
The other option is to attach the small satellite to the target satellite, which involves 
adding a mating or docking system to the smaller satellite.  The docking or mating system 
will greatly increase the satellite’s complexity and mandate the need for a propulsion 
system.  A docking or mating mechanism will require a more robust command and data 
handling (C&DH) system and the computer code to control the maneuvers that will be 
required to use the system.  These requirements will drive the satellite’s cost to a much 
higher level and will likely push the envelope of size of the satellite beyond the desired 
dimensions. 
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The smallest satellite that has flown with an autonomous docking system is 
NextSAT of the OE mission.  NextSAT was designed to dock specifically with Astro 
with their docking interface.  This is not an interface that could be used to mate to an 
existing communications satellite.  NextSAT is double the size that appeals for the 
smaller satellite’s maximum dimensions.  The docking mechanism itself would 
encompass the volume of the desired satellite.  There are designs that the European Space 
Agency (ESA) is pursuing to develop this type of technology, but the sizes of their 
docking mechanisms remain too large for this application.  In the future, this type of 
mating system may be possible. 
Due to these considerations a jamming mission is not suitable to a smaller satellite 
of the desired dimensions and cost.  A larger satellite could be built to accomplish this 
mission, but its existence would be known to earth based observers.  Once it began its 
operations, it’s target satellite’s operators would easily be able to determine the source of 
the jamming signals and pursue diplomatic actions.  The negative media would likely 
cause sufficient uproar in the US for the program to be shut down.  The only time that 
Americans may support this type of program would be during a time of all out declared 
war, and even then there would be opponents to jamming satellites and the militarization 
of space. 
C. SATELLITE NEUTRALIZATION 
Due to the nature of most Americans, this mission in itself is the most 
controversial of all the missions analyzed.  Proponents and opponents to this type of 
activity have debated in various forums since the beginning of manned spaceflight over 
five decades ago.  To that extent the United Nation’s Committee on the Peaceful Uses of 
Outer Space (COPUOS), the international agreement which governs the use of space, has 
outlawed this use for a spacecraft or satellite.  That said this mission has the potential to 
be easily accomplished at a fairly low cost barring launch costs. 
Covert ASAT missions likely would not be supported by the US population.  The 
USG feels the need to preserve the inherent right of self-defense in all areas in which its 
forces operate.  The US feels that it has the right to position objects into space that could 
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be used to defend their own space assets.  For this reason US officially has voted against 
or abstained from voting on each “Prevention of an arms race in outer space” resolution 
presented through COPUOS31.  Some US citizens would likely agree to ratify such a 
resolution not realizing that such an agreement would not allow the US to protect its own 
interests in space should they become attacked by our enemies.  Every defense spacecraft 
program that has been created to perform proximity operations around another satellite 
has been surrounded by negative publicity.  Americans that fear this technology refer to 
these programs as only “really” being developed so that an ASAT weapon can be built 
and used to weaponize space.  From XSS-10 to DART (a NASA servicing mission to 
validate technology that if successful would have led to a Hubble Space Telescope 
service vehicle) critics have raised their voices in the media and on the floors of 
Congress.  These opposition groups have made funding viable dual use technology 
development programs very difficult.  With the Soviet Union’s collapse satellite 
programs involving autonomous rendezvous and proximity operations had lost their 
public backing completely until the Chinese shot down one of their own satellites in 
January 2007.  Sentiment has not changed greatly in the US since January 2007, but the 
tide may be turning as China continues to print articles on how it can jam 
telecommunications satellites during warfare. 
It is true that technology developed under these programs could be used to 
construct a very capable co-orbiter type ASAT, but XSS-10, XSS-11, and OE have only 
proven this technology at LEO. 
Although microsatellites are perceived primarily as a threat to satellites in 
LEO, they could be adapted to attack assets in geosynchronous orbit as 
well. A space mine would be effective only if it were orbiting very close 
to its quarry, in an almost identical orbit. The space mine would not need 
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disabling the mine without also risking the destruction of its much more 
valuable target, so the mine poses a similar threat whether its presence is 
known or unknown.32 
Various types of mission can be envisioned, an anti-satellite satellite (ASAT) can 
take multiple forms and still accomplish its objective.  Perhaps the easiest is to jam a 
satellite at such a high power that you damage very fragile components of the targeted 
satellite’s receiver system such as low noise amplifiers (LNAs).  Alternatively, the 
satellite could be no more than a space mine, that when directed, detonates and destroys 
satellites within range.  More sophisticated satellites could be designed with propulsion 
systems that allow them to intercept and collide with a target satellite.  Taking that notion 
to the next level would be to grapple an ASAT to its target.  Once the ASAT is connected 
to the target, it can use various methods to degrade or disable the target satellite.  With 
the effects delivered the satellite could move on to its next target, stay attached or move 
itself off into a final orbit where it would remain unobservable. 
A kinetic effect is any means that is used to hit a target with another object 
possessing a different velocity vector.  This type of effect could be delivered by a 
spacecraft shooting a projectile at a target or smashing a spacecraft directly into the 
target.  For either of these applications, a kinetic effect will damage and likely destroy the 
target satellite.  With the target destroyed, the portions of both spacecraft will be spread 
throughout that region of geostationary orbit.  Some fragments depending on their initial 
velocity vectors will be sent to super and sub geostationary regions.  The pieces of the 
spacecraft will range from large to small sizes.  Their momentum will be large enough to 
damage any satellite they happen to meet.  These components will effectively make that 
region of geostationary orbit unusable.  This may be advantageous by denying a 
particularly useful orbit slot to our enemies, but it would prevent its use by the USG and 
our allies.  The use of a kinetic effect at geostationary orbit would effectively deny the 
use of this orbit to everyone for a very long time. 
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The disadvantages of a kinetic effect ASAT are well founded.  Our military 
functions most effectively with public support.  As the Chinese ASAT demonstration in 
January of 2007 showed, this type of activity is not openly supported by the USG and the 
US public.33  Making an orbit unusable by scattering debris in it may also be unwise.  
Out of the proposed ASAT architectures, only the rendezvousing type ASAT seems to be 
appropriate. 
The rendezvousing ASAT must be sized to avoid detection before it arrived at 
geostationary orbit, while it was operating and also after it operated.  Therefore, the 
cross-sectional length of the satellite would need to be 0.7 meters or less34.  If a cube type 
satellite was to be constructed for simplicity sake, no dimensions could be larger than a 
half meter to remain unobservable by current earth based sensors.  In addition to the 
physical dimension constraint, all surfaces must employ low reflectant materials for 
camouflage.  These materials will prevent large amounts of light from being reflected off 
the satellite to the earth. 
The ASAT would require a large amount of propellant or electrical power to 
allow it to reach the target from a seed geostationary orbit.  For instance a satellite with a 
mass of 14.5 kilograms requires approximately 1,800 meters per second of velocity 
change to complete two Hohmann transfers to change its equatorial longitudinal position 
at geostationary orbit by fifteen degrees in six days.35  Depending on the performance of 
the satellite’s propulsion system this could be anywhere from five tenths of a kilogram of 
xenon for a Hall Effect thruster to forty-five kilograms of cold gas for a mono-propellant 
thruster with an ISP of 300 seconds.  Forty-Five kilograms of cold gas would amount to 
about three times the satellite’s original mass causing the resulting satellite to mass to be 
about 60 kilograms.  Five tenths of a kilogram of xenon is certainly feasible, but a Hall 
Effect Thruster (HET) requires 1,400 watts of continuous power at a minimum 
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throughout such a maneuver36, which could not be supported by a smaller satellite’s EPS.  
Not to mention that the mass of the propulsion system’s engine would also have to be 
factored into the mass equation, thus causing the need for even more propellant.37  A 
smaller satellite will not have the available volume or power to support either type of 
propulsion system. 
Even if the ASAT had a propulsion system to allow it to rendezvous, it would also 
require the computing power to handle onboard navigation and possess a precise ADCS 
so it could dock with the target satellite.  Docked to the target, the ASAT would need to 
have a mechanism that it could be used to attack components or the bus of the target 
satellite.  With these abilities, the ASAT would have the ability to interrupt operations, 
damage components or destroy the target.  After these effects were delivered, the ASAT 
could remain attached, or if it had enough propulsion it could maneuver away from the 
target to conduct another mission. 
Unfortunately, there is no propulsion system that could give a smaller satellite of 
half meter dimensions the performance necessary to perform the maneuvers required to 
successful conduct a rendezvous ASAT mission.  No known mechanisms exist to allow 
the ASAT to damage the target, their development would likely be expensive.  The last 
problem is a docking system.  No standard system currently exists.  OE used a docking 
system between Astro and NextSAT, but that system only worked between those two 
satellites.  Which leads to another new system to be developed that would have the ability 
to mate the ASAT to any type of target satellite.  This would induce more complexity and 
expense into the ASAT’s development. 
With these findings based on current smaller satellite technology and American 
ethics, a geostationary ASAT is not currently practical.  In the event of a declared war, 
this type of weapon built in a small satellite sized or larger structure is completely  
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feasible.  To that extent, building such a few such satellites for the US’s tactical inventory 
would be a useful step to ensure preparation for the next war, which may likely involve 
warfare that is conducted outside of earth’s atmosphere. 
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VI. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS (CONOPS) 
A. GENERAL OPERATIONS 
The following metrics were generated to analysis the potential that smaller 
satellites may possess to conduct a covert optical survey mission.  They were not adapted 
from any existing SSA requirement, nor were they based on an existing space program.  
For the purpose of this analysis a covert optical survey mission could be conducted 
successfully if it met the follow metrics. 
These metrics are: 
• Image all satellites operating at geostationary orbit at a maximum spatial 
resolution of one half meter. 
• Image 95 percent of the satellites operating within 0.05 degrees inclination 
of the geostationary belt at a maximum spatial resolution of one half 
meter. 
• 30 day re-visit rate for geostationary satellites. 
• Altitude determined by the separation distance required for a minimum 
target spatial resolution of 20 centimeters. 
• Relay all imagery through the Air Force Satellite Control Network 
(AFSCN) or the Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System (TDRSS) 
within two hours of collection. 
• Remain undetectable from earth based sensors. 
• Two year mission life. 
• Ability to perform station keeping maneuvers. 
• COTS equipment incorporated to the maximum extent without degrading 
performance. 
While each satellite designed will strive to remain as inexpensive as possible, no 
funding limit has been imposed.  The goal is to determine if this mission can be 
accomplished in the size satellite selected, not constraining capabilities due to fiscal 
limits.  The listed performance metrics will drive the design requirements for each 
satellite size, in size increments listed. 
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To meet these performance criteria, a constellation of satellites will be needed.  
The satellites in each constellation need to be separated by equal amounts of equatorial 
longitude, so their collective work will meet the 30 day re-visit rate.  The altitude of each 
constellation will be driven by the performance of their respective optical payload.  Each 
constellation will be stationed at a distance from the geostationary belt that will allow 
them to image the satellites at the Closest Point of Approach (CPA) at a spatial resolution 
of 20 centimeters.  With the nominal altitude determined by the optical payload, the 
payload must also have the ability to image the targets with a wide enough spectral range 
to make accurate, discernable conclusions about the objects in the image.  Using 
IKONOS’s monochromatic imaging properties as a guide; the spectral range requires that 
each pixel has eleven bits to store its captured spectral information.38 
The optical systems will need to utilize the most advanced square matrix Focal 
Plane Arrays (FPAs) currently produced.  Kodak produces COTS square matrix FPAs 
with various pixel pitch sizes.  Kodak is currently evolving their production process 
allowing the pixel size in the FPAs to shrink with each revision.  Pixel size is also 
referred to as pixel pitch.  Each pixel is its own detector making up the FPA’s imaging 
sensors.  Effectively the smaller the pixel’s pitch, the better the performance of an optical 
system.  With each pixel’s size decreasing, Charge-Coupled Devices (CCDs) can be 
constructed with more pixels within a given area.  Modern CCD matrix imagers contain 
thousands to millions of pixels per CCD.  Each image captured of a targeted satellite 
using a modern CCD matrix imager will likely contain a large amount of non-useful 
background.  Autonomous optical system post processing techniques will need to “crop” 
around the target in the images to remove 90 percent of these non-useful pixels.  The 
resulting useful, “cropped” image will then be compressed using lossless compression 
techniques to limit the size of any image to a few kilobytes of data.  These reduced image 
sizes will allow data transmission to occur over shorter timeframes which will allow the 
satellite to orient itself in the most advantageous orientation to remain undetectable, 
absorb solar energy and release thermal energy. 
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Patch array antennae that possess appropriate size and performance characteristics 
for use on a smaller satellite possess a narrow boresight which allows the antenna to have 
a relatively high directivity.  This directivity is needed so that the smaller satellite can 
complete its link budget to earth or a space based relay.  It is therefore likely that during 
imaging operations, a satellite will not be in an appropriate geometry to directly relay 
imagery.  Due to the size constraints levied on the satellites, it is unrealistic to assume a 
gimbaled antenna could be incorporated into the satellites’ design.  Therefore the 
satellites will need to have the ability to store and then forward their data.  Once the 
satellites have completed the imaging, they will have to relay the data to their ground 
operators through either the TDRSS constellation or the AFSCN.  To transmit data to 
TDRSS, the satellites will need to transmit their TT&C and data over S-Band.  This will 
drive the selection of an S-Band capable antenna and radio system.  The size of the 
satellites will also dictate the use of a directional antenna to deliver the required 
performance to complete the link budget.  The operation of a directional antenna 
combined with the payload drive the pointing requirements for satellite. 
The satellites will need an embedded 3-axis stabilization system to orient them 
properly to conduct their missions.  This drives an ADCS that has the ability to sense the 
satellites’ position and orientation.  They require a sensor package to determine these 
aspects and also a system to steer the satellites’ to the desired orientation.  For these 
satellites to perform their missions, they will require a miniaturized ADCS that has a 
capability equivalent to the ADCS of modern satellites.  Smaller satellites will need to 
have a star tracker, sun sensors and earth sensor to feed the ADCS allowing it to 
accurately determine the satellite’s attitude and position for imaging operations.  For 
attitude control they will need to use small Reaction Wheels (RWs) or miniature Control 
Moment Gyros (CMGs) that are sized to move the satellites about their axes for imaging 
operations, communications transmission and to overcome environmental induced 
torques acting on the satellite.  With these systems in place the ADCS will be able to 
orient the satellite so that it can accomplish its mission. 
Due to orbital perturbations at geostationary orbit the satellites will need to have a 
Reaction Control System (RCS) that can actively adjust the satellite’s orbit so that it 
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maintains a zero degree inclination at its assigned altitude above earth.  The RCS will 
need to utilizes inputs from the satellite’s ADCS system and be able to autonomously 
make these maneuvers when its ground operators permit such operations.  The satellite’s 
propulsion system must be sized to conduct these maneuvers throughout the MDL.  As 
well as accounting for these maneuvers, the propulsion system must have the 
performance to conduct a single maximum longitude change of fifteen degrees utilizing 
two Hohmann-like transfers.  This ability is needed for possible orbit injection methods 
and may be necessary for satellite re-phasing in the event of satellite failure causing 
extended constellation coverage outages of high value targets. 
Given the harsh environment of geostationary orbit, each satellite requires a 
computer and a secondary, back-up processor that are radiation hardened to withstand the 
expected radiation levels over the MDL.  With two processors operating simultaneously, 
it is unlikely that the satellite will ever experience dual SEUs that would have the ability 
to shut down each processor at the same time, halting satellite operations.  While this 
may double the mass, volume and power requirements for the satellite’s C&DH, it will 
also provide necessary redundancy in this critical area. 
For these components to operate properly, a thermal control system (TCS) will 
need to maintain the satellites’ components in their safe operating temperature ranges.  
Each satellite will require its own unique TCS that utilizes active and passive thermal 
control components designed to operate during periods of eclipse at the equinoxes.  The 
TCS components will also need to leave the smallest footprint on the satellites’ volume, 
power and mass as possible.  To do this the satellites will need to employ a spread 
thermal control technique.  This technique encompasses placing components around the 
satellite’s interior to effectively spread the heat produced by these components 
throughout the satellite.  This type of technique allows passive heating of the satellite.  
Employing this technique should allow the TCS to only need to run one heater at a time 
when active heating is necessary.  This and other constraints are imposed in the design of 
the TCS to minimize power requirements during any satellite operation.  Each satellite 
will utilize a passive radiator to dissipate excess heat to deep space.  When possible, 
proper operation of the radiator requires it to be pointed away from earth and the other 
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celestial objects.  This ensures that thermal energy is released by the cooling system and 
not induced through the radiator into the satellite. 
To operate all of these required systems, the satellites require a custom EPS 
capable of regulating and distributing power during operations.  Critical to the 
performance of the EPS is the area of the solar arrays and their orientation to the sun.  
The solar arrays will be limited in their dimensions by the half-meter requirement 
constraint.  To this extent, the maximum solar array area in any orientation is a quarter of 
a square meter.  With this available solar array area, the type of solar cells selected for 
each satellite will need to have the End of Life (EOL) performance to convert enough 
solar energy to sufficiently power the satellite’s EPS.  The satellite’s size will constrain 
the solar arrays to be hard mounted to the satellite’s structure; gimballing sun-tracking 
mechanisms for the solar arrays will not be possible due to technological and power 
budget constraints.  The ADCS must orient the satellite in the most advantageous 
geometry relative to the sun whenever possible to produce the maximum amount of solar 
energy.  Along with the area constraints, the batteries will require sufficient energy 
storage density to minimize battery volume while retaining the ability to power the 
satellite’s EPS through an eclipse cycles at the EOL performance with only half of the 
battery cells operating properly.  This requirement will allow enough redundancy for the 
satellite to continue to operate properly if half of the cells fail before MDL. 
With the satellites properly designed, they will have the ability to completely 
perform their assigned mission.  Autonomous imaging operations for each satellite 
require three pictures of all targets to be captured.  A picture will be taken before CPA, 
one at the CPA and one after CPA with the target satellite.  When the satellite has the 
ability to transfer data, it will transmit all stored data and TT&C information and then 
receive an updated set of operation orders.  These orders will list targets and imaging 
time sequences for the next two weeks.  If one minute passes after completion of the 
satellite’s data transmission without beginning to receive an updated set of orders, the 
satellite will break the communication’s link and execute its current set of orders.  When 
the satellite is not imaging it will orient itself in the most advantageous attitude to 
maintain geometry between itself, the sun and earth to prevent sun light from reflecting 
 46
off of it back to earth.  While maintaining a “concealing” attitude, the satellite must also 
optimize its attitude for energy production and pointing its radiator away from celestial 
heat sources.  A satellite will only be able to operate its propulsion system when not 
imaging or transmitting or receiving data.  To this extent satellite operations are 




VII. CONSTELLATION DESIGN 
A. METHOD UTILIZED TO CONDUCT PRELIMINARY SATELLITE 
DESIGNS 
The goal of this analysis was to determine if smaller satellites could perform the 
optical survey mission covertly.  The Half-Meter-Cube satellite was chosen based on the 
maximum dimensions that a satellite could be built to have a cross sectional length less 
than 0.7 meters, the current benchmark size for earth based sensors to detect objects near 
geostationary orbit using long-dwell imagery techniques.  Due to the growing interest in 
the CubeSat standard, the smallest and largest standard sizes, 1U and 5U respectfully, 
were chosen for this analysis.  Each CubeSats’ cross sectional length is less than 0.7 
meters. 
Designing the three primary sizes of satellites involved multiple iterations.  The 
first phase in satellite design was to develop a set of requirements that each satellite size 
would be designed to meet to perform the assigned mission.  After those requirements 
had been determined, then they were scrutinized thoroughly to assure they were 
comprehensive, yet realistic to accomplish the stated mission.  The requirements are 
listed in Table 2.  With an acceptable set of requirements, the preliminary design of the 
satellite began. 
In most missions, a payload is selected or created that meets the mission’s 
requirements.  The satellite is then designed around the payload.  This ensures that the 
payload can function properly which should ensure mission success for the satellite.  In 
this assigned mission it was equally important for the satellites to remain un-observed as 
it was for them to complete their imaging mission.  The requirement to remain 
undetectable drove the design process to begin with the satellite’s overall dimensions to 




Maximum Length 0.5 meters. 
Maximum Width 0.5 meters. 
Maximum Height 0.5 meters. Size 
Maximum mass of 100 kilograms. 
Image 95% of all satellites operating in the Geostationary belt with a 
30 day re-visit rate 
Image target satellites at a spatial resolution of 20 centimeters. 
Onboard position determination system. 
Downlink all data through AFSCN ground station network or TRDSS 
system  
Semi-Autonomious operations via ground cueing received by satellite 
2 year Mission Design Life (MDL) 
Mission 
COTS with emphasis on flown in space or designed for space 
operation at a minimum 
Transmit and receive S-Band communications 
Ability to store and then forward TT&C and data 
Downlink images within two hours of capture Equipment 
Reasonable cost 
Table 2.   Overarching Smaller Satellite Design Requirements. 
The overall preliminary design process involved using the physical dimensions of 
the satellite as the constraining factor, not the payload.  The largest satellite designed is 
the Half-Meter-Cube.  This size was chosen to maximize the volume available in the 
satellite to allow the largest possible optical payload to be incorporated.  The medium 
size is the 5U-CubeSat measuring ten centimeters by ten centimeters by 50 centimeters.  
The smallest size satellite chosen was the 1U-CubeSat.  The overall dimensions of each 
satellite were fixed constituting the maximum size for the Structure and Mechanisms 
Systems (SMS) of the satellite. 
Once the volume available for equipment had been determined, the search for 
proper COTS equipment began.  Most of the searching involved internet searches of 
aerospace corporations known to build satellite components.  When those initial searches 
were exhausted, the research continued with seed information from the CubeSat 
community via the CubeSat Workshop in April of 2007 and meeting vendors at the Small 
Satellite Conference in August 2007.  COTS equipment was selected based on whether it 
had flown in space or was space qualified, and would meet or exceed the satellite’s 
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objectives.  The next considerations were related to the component’s volume, power 
consumption, safe operating temperature range, reliability and cost. 
After the equipment was selected, the methodology described in SMAD was used 
to characterize the Electrical Power System (EPS).  Solar array sizes were maximized 
based on the 0.5 meter satellite dimensions for body mounted panels for the Half-Meter-
Cube satellite.  The 0.5 meter size requirement also limited the size of deployable solar 
wings for the 5U-CubeSat and the 1U-CubeSat.  The overall solar array dimensions were 
used to determine the maximum amount of solar energy that could be generated to power 
the satellite.  This calculation was limited to determine the worst case illumination 
geometry with the sun only illuminating one side of any of the satellites at a 30 degree 
angle of incidence39.  The EPS was furthered constrained to the performance of the solar 
array at its End of Life (EOL) efficiency of 23 percent.  The expected power produced 
was then applied to simple model of the expected operations while the satellite was 
orbiting the earth.  This established a rough power budget for use during both illuminated 
and eclipse operations.  These parameters were used to determine power available to 
operate the satellite, most importantly the payload in a worst case scenario. 
Optical payloads are point designs for particular missions, therefore it is 
extremely difficult, and in some cases impossible to use COTS components for optical 
payloads.  The 1U-CubeSat, limited severely by available volume was limited to a C328-
7640 JPEG Compression VGA Module (COTS board type camera) payload that operated 
onboard AeroCube-2.  Due to aperture and component size constraints, no COTS optical 
payloads could be identified for use in the Half-Meter-Cube or the 5U-CubeSat.  A 
custom optical payload would need to be manufactured for each of these satellites.  After 
researching several payload designs that have flown, or are currently operating on orbit, 
the Kodak Model 1000 Camera System (currently operating onboard IKONOS I block  
 
 
                                                 
39 Appendices A and B. 
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II)40 was chosen.  Each payload was then “sized” in mass, volume and power 
requirements using SMAD’s optical payload sizing equations41 which are based on the 
desired diameter of the optical payload. 
The focal length, diameter and operating wavelength for these payloads were 
analyzed to determine the maximum distance at which each satellite would operate to 
observe targets with a 20 centimeter spatial resolution.  The maximum distance was used 
as the constellation’s seed value for its altitude determination.  Orbital altitude for the 
constellation was set to the geostationary altitude minus this seed value.  The properties 
of the payloads were used to determine the distance at which an object could be observed 
at a spatial resolution of 50 centimeters.  This distance was then set to the maximum 
operating parameter for the payload. 
Through this analysis it was determined that the COTS payload for the 1U-
CubeSat would require the satellites to be positioned 500 meters42 below geostationary 
orbit.  At this orbital altitude the 1U-CubeSat constellation would require at least 2,000 
satellites.  The costs would be unreasonable to produce and operate this number of 
satellites.  With all other COTS optical system alternatives available to the 1U-CubeSat 
delivering poorer results, the design of the 1U-CubeSat was determined to be not possible 
for this mission.  The design for the 1U-CubeSat stopped at this point. 
With the payload selected for the Half-Meter-Cube and the 5U-CubeSat, an in-
depth design of the EPS was worked through several iterations as satellite components 
were verified for use.  These iterations involved looking at each operation the satellites 
would be expected to perform per orbit for the maximum duration expected under normal 
operations.  With these iterations complete, the requirements for each satellite’s battery 
were determined.  These requirements led to selecting four SAFT MP 176065  
 
                                                 
40 S. Kilston.  “Ikonos-2, Block-1.”  Sharing Earth Observation Resources.  16 April 2007.  1 May 
2006.  <http://directory.eoportal.org/pres_Ikonos2Block1.html>. 
41 Wiley J. Larson and James R. Wertz.  SPACE MISSION ANALYSIS AND DESIGN.  3rd ed.  El 
Segundo:  Microcosm Press, 2005.  285. 
42 Appendix C. 
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IntrgrationTM lithium ion batteries which are operating at geostationary orbit on the 
communications satellite, W3M.  Complete component selection is detailed the appendix 
for each satellite. 
With the EPS and satellite’s dimensions set, components were chosen based on 
their performance criteria, their physical dimensions and power requirements.  After 
these components were chosen they were placed into the satellite’s structure in a method 
to spread mass and heat production throughout the satellite’s available volume.  The 
moments of inertia were determined based on the center of mass of each component in 
relation to the coordinate system chosen for the satellite.  The satellite’s Center of 
Gravity (COG) and moments of inertia were determined.  Using these properties the pitch 
error related to Gravity gradient and Solar radiation torques were calculated.  The values 
of the maximum expected torques and moments of inertia were used to verify that the 
COTS equipment selected for the ADCS and the Reaction Control System (RCS) would 
appropriately provide 3-axis stability for each satellite.  With a properly functioning, 3-
axis stabilization system, the satellite’s optical payload would be able to perform its 
assigned mission. 
With a properly functioning ADCS, each satellite could also utilize a small 
directional type antenna.  This type of antenna could greatly increase the satellite’s 
capability by its small size and relatively high directional gain helping the satellite 
complete its overall link budget.  Following involved searches of the Institute of 
Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) online catalog maintained by the Dudley 
Knox Library several antenna types were identified.  Of the antenna identified, two 
versions were chosen due to their overall dimensions and directional gain.  These antenna 
types were identified in papers detailing conceptual satellite antenna designs that suited 
each satellite’s needs.  A 2x2 Microstrip Array Antenna43 was selected as the antenna for 
                                                 
43 James A. Nessel, Kory, C.L. Lambert, K.M. Acosta, R.J. and F. A.Miranda.  “A Microstrip Patch-
Fed Short Backfire Antenna for the Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System–Continuation (TDRSS-C) 
Multiple Access (MA) Array.”  Antennas and Propagation Society International Symposium EEE2006, (9-
14 July 2006), 894. 
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the Half-Meter-Cube.  A Microstrip Patch-Fed Short Backfire Antenna (SBA) Array44 
was selected for the 5U-CubeSat.  The antennae are used to transmit and receive data 
presenting a single mode of failure for each satellite.  These antennae allow the satellites 
to complete their link budget to a TDRSS satellite and the AFSCN.  With closed link 
budgets, the satellites are now able to perform their missions.  Effort was then directed 
into creating a thermal control system. 
The thermal control system was designed to maintain the satellites minimum and 
maximum equipment operating temperatures.  A first level thermal analysis was 
conducted for each satellite to determine the expected satellite temperatures at their 
operating altitudes during the equinoxes.  The worst case cold temperature was used to 
determine the number of active COTS Kapton heaters and their sizes, then their 
placement throughout the satellite.  The worst case hot temperature was used to 
determine the area that was needed for the passive radiator for each satellite.  With these 
requirements known a COTS Minco CT325 Thermal Control Module was selected to be 
used to regulate the temperature on each satellite.  A thermal coating would be applied to 
each satellite’s exterior.  That thermal coating would then be covered by six layers of 
Multiple Layer Insulation (MLI) that was painted with 3M Black Velvet45 spacecraft 
paint.  For the purposes of this examination, the assumption was made that critical 
components would be mounted to heat plates.  Each heat plate would have a miniaturized 
gas feed heat pipe that would transfer heat via conduction to the passive radiator once the 
heat plate reached a seed temperature.  The seed temperatures were selected to be within 
ten percent of the maximum operating temperatures for the equipment.  If a prototype 
design followed, the thermal system would be refined through testing to determine the 
optimum TCS. 
With the TCS design complete, all major systems and subsystems were then 
complete.  Unfortunately both the Half-Meter-Cube and the 5U-CubeSat satellites’ 
                                                 
44 Ajay K. Sharma, S.K. Agrawal, D.S. Rajpurohit, R. Singh. and A. Mittal.  “A Wideband Microstrip 
Array Antenna With Unique Dumbbell Shaped Aperture Coupled Radiating Elements.”  Antennas and 
Propagation Society International Symposium EEE2006, (9-14 July 2006), 891. 
45 Wiley J. Larson and James R. Wertz.  SPACE MISSION ANALYSIS AND DESIGN.  3rd ed.  El 
Segundo:  Microcosm Press, 2005.  436. 
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designs were flawed.  Neither satellite’s payload was designed with a sunshade.  A 
sunshade is required to reduce the potential for stray light from entering the aperture 
during imaging operations.  Relatively long re-visit periods drive sunshades to be 
incorporated in each smaller satellite’s design to reduce expected glare periods, especially 
during target satellite imaging opportunity windows.  The solution chosen for each 
satellite is detailed in the following sections. 
B. HALF-METER-CUBE SATELLITE PAYLOAD RE-DESIGN 
The largest size small satellite was chosen to meet the largest sized object that 
could operate near geostationary orbit while remaining undetected by current earth based 
observation systems46.  The maximum dimensions for this satellite are 0.5 meter in 
length, 0.5 meter in width and 0.5 meter in height.  Through the design process, the 
satellite’s structure was held to these dimensions to allow the maximum sizing of the 
payload to be incorporated into the satellite along with all of its support systems’ 
equipment.  The custom optical payload possessed a 40 centimeter diameter aperture with 
a 2.23 meter focal length that was folded five times.  The payload was scaled off the “The 
[Kodak] Model 1000 camera system consists of the following elements: OTS (Optical 
Telescope Unit), FPU (Focal Plane Unit), DPU (Digital Processing Unit), PSU (Power 
Supply Unit), and CU (Cabling Unit).”47  A Kodak KAF-39000-AAA-DD-AE CCD 
monochrome CCD with a 6.8 micron pixel pitch was incorporated into the scaled custom 
payload to replace the Focal Plane Unit (FPU) to deliver better optical performance.  The 
entire payload was hermetically seal to allow the CCD to operate at a pressure of one 
atmosphere.  It was determined to have a mass of 8.8 kilograms and consume a maximum 
of 18 watts of power while imaging.  A twenty centimeter spatial resolution could be 
obtained when the custom payload was positioned 64 kilometers from a target.  This 
resolution established an operating altitude of approximately 35720 kilometers. 
                                                 
46 Heiner Klinkrad.  Space Debris: Models and Risk Analysis.  Chichester, UK.  Springer, 2006.  32. 
47 S. Kilston.  Ikonos-2, Block-1.  1 May 2006.  Accessed 16 April 2007.  
<http://directory.eoportal.org/pres_Ikonos2Block1.html>. 
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With the payload defined, the satellite’s subsystems and their components were 
selected.  The resulting satellite has a mass of 37.5 kilograms.  This satellite met all 
requirements, but it failed to incorporate a sunshade into the payload’s design.  The sun 
shade for IKONOS’s optical system was provided by the satellite’s structure. 
Glare is induced in an optical system when the geometry between the sun, the 
target satellite and imaging payload are oriented in a way that allows light from the sun to 
enter the optical system.  These rays will effectively distort the images captured by the 
CCD, ruining each image in which glare is induced.  The sunshade would effectively 
prevent off-axis light rays from the sun from entering the optical system at certain 
geometries, but not when the sun was directly in the optical system’s Field of View 
(FOV).  A sunshade would give the satellites the ability to mitigate some of these 
situations, which is very attractive due to the 30 day target satellite re-visit rate.  To 
incorporate a sunshade, the custom optical payload’s design and the Half-Meter-Cube 
satellite had to be re-designed. 
A sun shade must meet two parameters to prevent the introduction of off axis 
glare due to light incident upon the focal array.  The sun shade must be at least the same 
diameter as the optical system’s aperture and at least equal to one-half of the aperture’s 
diameter in its overall length. 
Two methods were analyzed for sun shade incorporation to determine which 
offered the best characteristics to the satellite’s overall design.  The first and easiest 
approach was to add a sun shade of the proper dimensions to the satellite’s external 
structure.  The second method is to add the sun shade into the focal plane array and re-
size the components of the optical payload to fit into their new smaller volume. 
Utilizing the first method, the first implementation considered was a telescoping 
sun shade that could deploy during imaging operations and then retract during non-
imaging operations.  Adding a deployable unit would induce more complexity concerning 




mechanism jammed while deploying or retracting.  There consideration would lower the 
satellite’s reliability.  To ensure that the satellite would be able to meet its MDL, this 
option was not pursued any further. 
A simple add-on method was analyzed next that mounted a solid sunshade 
directly to the satellite’s structure.  The required length of the sun shade was calculated to 
be 0.2 meters; therefore the overall length of the satellite in the x-axis would have been 
0.7 meters.  That would have caused the satellite to be out of specifications by 40 percent 
of the required maximum length along the satellite’s x-axis.  Violating the requirements 
was not possible so the satellite’s entire payload was re-designed. 
The optical payload was then re-designed utilizing the second method which 
incorporated a sun shade into the optical payload’s 45 centimeter focal plane.  The 
sunshade is 201 millimeters in diameter and 125 millimeters in overall length.  This 
limited the payload’s folded focal length from 2.230 to 1.742 meters and its aperture from 
40 to 25 centimeters.  The overall performance of the optical payload decreased as well 
from a 20 centimeters spatial resolution achieved from approximately 64 kilometers to 51 
kilometers.  Figure 2 show the satellite’s design incorporating each method. 
The performance of this optical system is reduced compared to the original optical 
properties, but it will allow the satellite to meet requirements.  With this new optical 
payload, the modified half-meter cube satellite to have a CPA range of 51 kilometers 
from target satellites to obtain a spatial resolution of 20 centimeters.  The first level 
satellite design for the Half-Meter-Cube was now complete. 
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Figure 2.   Illustrations of Half-Meter Cube Satellite with Sun Shade incorporated using 
each method. 
The first approach allows the maximum size aperture for the optical payload that 
can fit in the satellite’s overall structure. It also has a major drawback, since the optical 
payload is carried along an axis of the satellite that already is at the maximum size of a 
half meter, the additional length of a sun shade makes this dimension longer than the half 
meter length requirement.  Violating the original constraining dimension requirement for 
the satellite by simply adding a sun shade the satellite’s external structure, is not a viable 
option.  Therefore the second, less desirable approach is mandated.  With the second 
method utilized, the overall payload performance of the half-meter cube satellite was 
defined.48 
C. 5U-CUBESAT PAYLOAD RE-DESIGN 
The 5U-CubeSat was the “middle-size” satellite type design to be analyzed for 
this thesis.  Its dimensions are designed to meet the standards set forth by California 
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Polytechnic Institute and Stanford University for CubeSat standard dimensions, but not 
the mass.  The standard dimensions do not exceed the mission’s requirements. 
Through the design process, the satellite’s structure was held to these dimensions 
to allow the maximum sizing of the payload to be incorporated into the satellite along 
with all of its support systems’ equipment.  The satellite is 50 centimeters in length (x-
axis) and ten centimeters the y and z-axes as seen in Figure 3.  Due to stabilization 
consideration, the center of the satellite’s x-axis was reserved for the 3-axis stabilization 
subsystem.  This space allocation allowed a maximum of fifteen centimeters to be 
allocated for the satellite’s payload along the x-axis. 
Using the constraint of a maximum fifteen centimeters payload length, the custom 
optical payload was scaled using a nine centimeter diameter aperture.  Scaled off Kodak’s 
Model 1000 Camera System, it incorporated a Kodak KAF-38300 Monochrome CCD 
with a 5.4 micron pixel pitch vice the FPU normally employed.  The entire payload was 
hermetically seal to allow the CCD to operate at a pressure of one atmosphere.  It was 
determined to have a mass of 0.9971 kilograms and a 553 millimeter focal length.  The 
focal length was folded five times to a linear length of 111 millimeters, which is inside 
the fifteen centimeters allotted for the payload.  The payload was also designed to 
function as a star tracker like the payload flown in XSS-10.  The payload was determined 
to consume 2.04 watts of power while imaging or functioning as a star tracker.  A twenty 
centimeter spatial resolution could be obtained when this payload was positioned 20.5 
kilometers from a target.  This resolution established an operational altitude of 35765 
kilometers. 
With the payload defined, the satellite’s subsystems and their equipment were 
selected.  The resulting satellite has a mass of 14.48 kilograms.  This satellite met all 
requirements, but it failed to incorporate a sunshade into the payload’s design.  
Fortunately there was spare room inside of the satellite’s structure so that the payload 
could be simply recessed to create a self-contained sunshade.  A simple change to the 5U-
CubeSat’s structure and re-calculating the satellite’s moments of inertia and torques 
would correct this problem. 
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The re-design recessed the payload by 45 millimeters into the satellite’s structure.  
The added mass of the aluminum cylinder (used as the sunshade) was assumed to be 
included in the ten percent overall mass margin added to the satellite’s mass.  With the 
sunshade included, the payload’s overall length was determined to be 156 millimeters.  
This length was only six millimeters longer than the length originally allocated for the 
payload.  Due to this small increase in size and the spare five centimeters between 
equipment in the satellite’s x-axis, the 3-axis stabilization system was shifted by one 
centimeter in the positive x-axis.  The center of the satellite’s mass only shifted by one 
millimeter in the x-axis and did not change in the y or x-axes. 
Incorporating the re-design of the 5U-CubeSat had no effect on the satellite’s 
performance.  The design meets all requirements for the assigned mission.49 
 
Figure 3.   5U-CubeSat Design Illustration. 
                                                 
49 Appendix B. 
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D. FAILED 1U-CUBESAT DESIGN 
The 1U-CubeSat design began as each previous satellite with the exception of the 
optical payload.  Aerospace Corporation built and launched AeroCube-2 using five C328-
7640 JPEG Compression VGA Modules as the payload.  For that reason, the 1U-CubeSat 
was designed to carry one of these cameras. 
The 1U-CubeSat design began by incorporating one of these units as the entire 
payload.  Through mathematical analysis the performance of this payload was analyzed 
for the assigned mission.  The 1U-CubeSat would be required to orbit 500 meters below 
geostationary orbit to image the satellites operating there at a 20 centimeter spatial 
resolution.  At this altitude it would take the satellite 462 years to circumnavigate the 
geostationary belt.  This drives a constellation of more than 2,000 satellites equally 
spaced in relation to equatorial longitude along the same orbital plane to posses a 30 day 
re-visit rate.  This analysis determined that this payload could not realistically meet the 
requirements for this mission due the small aperture size and focal length which required 
an extremely large number of satellites to constitute the constellation.   The large number 
of satellites would cause the program to be extremely expensive to build and operate. 
All other COTS camera-on-a-board type alternatives analyzed performed worse.  
These results determined that current optical payloads for 1U size CubeSats could not 
meet the mission objectives.  The design for the 1U-CubeSat was terminated at this 
point.50 
The only other option was to build a custom deployable aperture similar to the 
aperture currently being built for the James Webb Space Telescope (JWST) by Ball 
Aerospace.  While it presents a concept to be able to utilize a useful size aperture, it is not 
currently feasible.  The technology for the JWST has just been developed for large 
satellite and it will take years, if not decades to miniaturize that technology to a level that 
could be used on a 1U-CubeSat. 
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Even if it were possible to design a JWST type aperture for a 1U-CubeSat, which 
could give the satellite a 26 centimeter aperture other problems still exist.  A mechanism 
would need to be developed to deploy an effective sunshade.  Deployable solar arrays 
would need to be mounted to produce the energy required to operate the satellite.  A 3-
axis stabilization system and attitude determination system does not exist in a size small 
enough to fit into the 1U-CubeSat with all the other sub-systems that also needed to 
operate within the satellite’s internal volume.  These concerns all prove that a 1U-
CubeSat can not be built to meet the requirements set by the assigned optical survey 
mission at this time or in the foreseeable future. 
E. STK SIMULATIONS 
Simulation was chosen as a tool to evaluate each satellite constellation’s 
performance to complete the assigned optical survey mission.  STK was chosen to 
conduct the simulations due to the capabilities of the software.  Another attractive feature 
is that the software is continually updated to provide the user a wide array of current tools 
to analyze satellite operations and up to date two-line element (TLE) sets for cataloged 
satellites.  STK version 8.1 was utilized for all simulations. 
The first approach to model this mission was to create the current geosynchronous 
and geostationary orbits by adding all satellites known to be currently operating in those 
regions.  The simulation period was set to begin at noon on 1 July 2007 and run until 
noon of 30 July 2007.  This period of time allowed the simulation period to cover 30 days 
exactly. 
A constellation of various operating communications satellites was created for the 
simulation using the illustration created by Boeing Corporation as a guide to the 
operational communication satellites51 positioned in geostationary and geosynchronous 
orbits.  Satellites were chosen by their orbital properties and their position in longitude 
around the geostationary belt.  After the initial 40 satellites were added to the simulation, 
ten more were selected to fill the large longitudinal gaps, with the exception of the central 
                                                 
51 “Commercial Communications Satellites Geosynchronous Orbit”.  30 June 2006.  12 June 2007.  
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Pacific Ocean where no satellites are known to currently operate.  The simulation 
contains the majority of the AMC, APSTAR, ARABSAT, HOT_BIRD, INTELSAT, 
SINOSAT, SUPERBIRD, and ZHONGXING constellations.  The resulting large gaps 
between these satellites were filled by adding CHINASTAR-1, ECHOSTAR-2, NSS-5, 
PAS-9 and TELSTAR-10.  The resulting constellation’s largest gap between satellites is 
24 degrees between APSTAR-5 and SUPERBIRD-B2 over the central Pacific Ocean. 
This simulation set-up was used for both the development of the Half-Meter-Cube 
satellite constellation and the 5U-CubeSat constellation.  Each satellite type was placed at 
the altitude at which their respective optical payload could image geostationary satellites 
at the spatial resolution design limit of 20 centimeters.  With the simulation set-up, the 
satellite to be modeled was created and a sensor matching its optical payload was added 
to the satellite.  A “GEOSTAsats constellation” was added to the simulation and all of the 
communication satellites were added to this constellation.  The satellite’s payload was 
then assigned to target the “GEOSTAsats constellation.  The simulation was run to 
confirm proper satellite operation.  Once the satellite in the simulation was determined to 
operate properly a constellation consisting of that type of satellite was created. 
Each constellation began with a “seed” number of satellites that was determined 
on the “Constellation Planning” worksheet52 for each satellite.  This “seed” number was 
used with STK’s “Walker” satellite tool.  This tool allows the user to create a type of 
Walker constellation by defining the number of satellites, the number of orbital planes, 
satellites per plane, inter plane spacing and RAAN spread.  “Delta” type Walker 
constellations were created using the “seed” number of satellites on the same plane to 
create the constellations for each simulation.  Once each constellation was created, the 
constellation was run to determine if the number of satellites allowed the constellation to 
demonstrate a 30 day re-visit.  If the constellation did not, the number of “seed” satellites 
was adjusted and the simulation was run again.  After multiple iterations each  
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constellation design was finalized.  The Half-Meter-Cube constellation required 15 
satellites while the 5U-CubeSat constellation required 33 satellites all placed at their 
optimum imaging altitudes.53 
1. Half-Meter-Cube Constellation Coverage Properties 
The Half-Meter-Cube constellation performed very well.  It was able to image 
every communications satellite operating at geostationary orbit.  In fact the constellation 
was able to image every communications satellite with the exception of ARABSAT-2A, 
SINOSAT-2 and SUPERBIRD-6.  Of the satellites not observed SINOSAT-2 has the 
lowest inclination, 0.3235 degrees.  Even at a relatively low inclination, the smallest slant 
range a Half-Meter-Cube could achieve with the elliptically orbiting SINOSAT-2 was 
476 kilometers at the target satellite’s apogee or perigee.  That slant range is more than 
three times larger than Half-Meter-Cube’s maximum imaging range of 128 kilometers.  
The only opportunity one of these satellites would have to image that satellite is if they 
passed by while it was ascending or descending the node of its orbit.  Even though five 
separate Half-Meter-Cube satellites passed by the communications satellite, none of them 
were able to meet SINOSAT-2 at these two critical locations in its orbit.  Each Half-
Meter-Cube could have taken a picture of SINOSAT-2 anytime they passed it, however 
those images would have had a spatial resolution greater than the required maximum 
performance requirements.  While those images would be better than no images, they 
were still outside of the performance requirements for this analysis.  This incident 
reinforced the fact that even if a target satellite is in a near geostationary orbit, if its orbit 
is slightly inclined or ellipticity is not zero the slant range between the imaging satellite 
may be too great for an image to be taken with a spatial resolution less than a half meter. 
Even though this perfect meeting for targets to be imaged can only occur twice 
during each of their orbits, it did occur for some satellites.  The optical payload for the 
Half-Meter-Cube satellite is limited to 128 kilometers maximum range.  Using Euclidean 
geometry, this means that the satellite will only be able to image target satellites with a 
maximum inclination of 0.086 degrees operating with an altitude of 35,785.9 
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kilometers54.  With trying to optimize the constellation to image higher inclined targets, 
the Half-Meter-Cube constellation was still able to image INTELSAT-603, with an 
inclination of 4.679 degrees as seen in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4.   INTELSAT-603 at it’s ascending node being imaged by a Half-Meter-Cube. 
This was an impressive result.  The satellites in the constellation were able to 
image geosynchronous satellites when they happened to pass by the targeted satellite 
while it was ascending or descending the node of its orbit.  The constellation had a 100 
percent coverage rate for geostationary satellites and a 94 percent coverage rate for all 
communications satellites during the 30 day period of the simulation55. 
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2. 5U-CubeSat Constellation Coverage Properties 
The 5U-CubeSat constellation performed well.  It was able to image every 
communications satellite operating at geostationary orbit.  The constellation was no able 
to image AMC-10, AMC-12, APSTAR-5, ARABSAT-2A, SINOSAT-1, SINOSAT-2 or 
SUPERBIRD-6.  Lowest inclined of the satellites not imaged was AMC-12 with an 
inclination of only 0.0032 degrees.  This was an unexpected result.  Further research 
revealed that AMC-12 has an eccentricity of 0.0004 and a RAAN of 319.4 degrees.  The 
variation from a non-perfect circular orbit allows the satellite’s orbit to be slightly longer 
at its apogee and perigee and slightly smaller 90 degrees from either of these positions.  
AMC-12 remained unobserved due to the time at which the 5U-CubeSat passed by it, 
which occurred when AMC-12 was near its own perigee as seen in Figure 5.  The 
constellation was able to image some of the satellites that were operating in 
geosynchronous orbit when they happened to pass by the targeted satellite while it 
ascended or descended the node of their orbits.  Of these satellites, INTELSAT-603 with 
an inclination of 4.679 degrees was imaged for 186 seconds. 
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Figure 5.   AMC-12 with a 56 kilometer CPA with a 5UCubeSat. 
This constellation had a 100 percent coverage rate for the geostationary orbit and 
an 86 percent coverage rate for the all communications satellites the 30 day period of the 
simulation.56 
F. COST ANALYSIS 
In a satellite’s design, the determination of the cost is perhaps the most frustrating 
and difficult task.  When a constellation of satellites is desired, total system cost becomes 
more involved and difficult to determine.  Ground work first needs to be laid by which a 
grounded cost estimation can be forged and remain consistent throughout the process.  In 
this examination, a complete cost model will not be developed.  Instead a sense for the 
overall constellation and operation cost will be estimated. 
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The cost estimation process for the Half-Meter-Cube microsatellite and 5U-
CubeSat constellations were identical.  Neither program was restricted in any fiscal 
aspect; an overall cost for each constellation was determined using processes detailed in 
SMAD with the inclusion of actual component cost when known.  Not all component 
costs were known forcing a hybrid method of a cost estimation to be employed.  When 
cost quotes were known they were converted into fiscal year 2000 (FY00) dollars.  
Inflation rate forecasts to convert cost to and from FY00 dollars were used from SMAD’s 
table 20-1.  Since these two constellations were designed to be operated by DoD and 
USG employers, the use of government equipment was considered to be free of charge, 
although the price to pay the work force was estimated.  Overall constellation cost 
determination was utilized using the learning curve percentage method presented in 
SMAD.  All contractor fees, bonuses and potential cost of work stoppages for any reason 
were not considered.  Constellation operations were estimated over the MDL, but 
constellation re-constitution in the event of earlier satellite failure was not estimated.  
With this ground work established, a hybrid parametric cost estimation was used to 
determine over all constellation cost. 
Parametric cost estimation is a method of using a “series of mathematical 
relationships that relate cost to physical, technical, and performance parameters that are 
known to strongly influence costs.  An equation called the Cost Estimating Relationship, 
or CER, expresses the cost as a function of parameters.”57  This method provides a top-
down approach for estimating a system’s cost.  Applying actual costs when they are 
known is a method to enhance this process.  This hybrid method was applied to keep the 
cost estimation process “grounded” where it could be applied.  
A common sense method for smaller satellite construction is to incorporate COTS 
equipment which sells regularly, demonstrating a predictable and current cost. 
Unfortunately, cost quotes, when provided, are a factor of the moment they were 
delivered.  Another consideration is that a satellite may be designed based on an existing 
COTS component.  By the time the satellite is to be built, that component may no longer 
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be produced.  If there is a more advanced unit, it can not be assumed that it will be fully 
compatible.  A relationship between the vendor and the satellite designer must be 
established early.  This relationship may ease the component procurement thorough the 
satellite’s development. 
Many manufacturers refuse to quote cost per unit due to various reasons, among 
which are propriety information, competition, and unwillingness to provide a quote to a 
non-purchaser.  If a quote can not be obtained, then the price must be estimated utilizing 
a CER.  SMAD provides three types of CERs to estimate cost.  These are “Estimating 
Subsystem RDT&E Cost”58, “Estimating Subsystem Theoretical First Unit (TFU) 
Cost”59, and “Cost-Estimating Relationships for Earth-orbiting Small Satellites Including 
RDT&E and Theoretical First Unit”60.  The CERs provided by SMAD were developed 
by the US Air Force and NASA.  CERs from these tables were used where appropriate in 
the cost estimation process. 
The first stage used in the cost estimation was to determine the cost of the TFU 
for each constellation.  TFU cost was determined by summing the cost of all known 
components and estimated component costs including computer code.  Once the TFU’s 
cost had been determined, then the costs of subsequent satellites were determined.  The 
cost will depend on the number of satellites to be built, recurring and non-recurring 
factors.  Once these areas are determined, “total production costs for all flight units are 
computed by multiplying the TFU cost by the learning curve factor”61.  This allowed the 
cost for the satellite constellation to be derived.  With the cost of the constellation 
determined, the cost to operate it needed to be estimated over the constellation’s MDL. 
The operational costs were simplified due to the assumption that the 
constellations will be operated using current DoD and USG facilitates and systems.  A 
conceptual ground operations scheme was estimated using a common sense approach.  
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This approach assumed that three government employees and two contractors would be 
needed to operate 15 satellites during daily eight hour shifts.  From this approach, the 
daily workforce was determined to be six contractors and nine government employees 
(including military operators) for every fifteen satellites in the constellation.  This 
satellite ground force would need to be employed over a minimum of the constellation’s 
MDL.  The estimation assumed that holidays and vacations would not affect the cost of 
this workforce.  The estimation did not consider the time required or extra cost associated 
with training this workforce.  The metrics of this workforce were used to determine the 
cost for personnel needed to operate and support the constellation throughout its MDL.  
The life cycle cost was determined by summing the constellation’s total cost, ground 
segment operations, maintenance costs and the cost for launch vehicle integration for 
each satellite.  It did not include potential launch costs, ground station, AFSCN or 
TDRSS usage fees or storage fees for completed satellites that are awaiting launch. 
1. Half-Meter Cube Constellation Cost 
The satellite is designed with 75 percent COTS components.  For 75 percent of 
these COTS components I was able to obtain a price quote.   I applied the inflation index 
for FY07 to current the cost of this equipment into FY00 dollars.  CER’s were used to 
calculate the price in FY00 dollars for the remaining 25 percent of the COTS 
components.  The custom satellite components, the satellite’s structure and computer 
code were determined solely through the use of CERs. 
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Figure 6.   Unit Cost for the Half-Meter-Cube satellite illustrated out to 40 units. 
The TFU cost was determined to be 1.6 Million FY00 dollars.  A learning curve 
slope of 90 percent62 was applied over the cost to build the fifteen satellite constellation.  
This curve can be seen in Figure 6 is plotted over a projected 40 unit project build.  The 
“knee-in-the-curve” shows the point in the production run in which the cost difference to 
produce following unit is nearly equal to the cost difference to produce that unit 
compared to one previous to it.  In the figure the green line highlighting the “knee-in-the-
curve” and the blue line showing the total number of satellites that need to built to field 
the constellation. 
The total constellation production cost was estimated to be 16 Million FY00 
dollars, with an average satellite production cost of slightly more than one Million FY00 
dollars.  The cost to operate the constellation per year was determined to slightly less than  
 
                                                 
62 Wiley J. Larson and James R. Wertz.  SPACE MISSION ANALYSIS AND DESIGN.  3rd ed.  El 
Segundo:  Microcosm Press, 2005.  809. 
 70
two Million FY00 dollars.  Overall USG cost for the constellation over its MDL is 
slightly less than 22 Million FY00 dollars, which translates into about 24.7 Million FY07 
dollars. 
2. 5U-CubeSat Constellation Cost 
The cost determination for the 5U-CubeSat constellation mimicked the method 
used for the Half-Meter Cube constellation.  Of the satellite’s components, 73 percent 
were COTS.  Of those COTS components, twenty percent were determined through the 
use of CERs, while the rest were quoted prices.  The custom components were calculated 
solely through the use of CERs. 
 
Figure 7.   Unit Cost for the 5U-CubeSat illustrated out to 40 units. 
 
The TFU cost was determined to be about 1.5 Million FY00 dollars.  A learning 
curve slope of 90 percent was applied over the cost to build the 33 satellite constellation.  
This learning curve can be seen in Figure 7 is plotted over a projected 40 unit project 
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build.  In the figure the green line highlighting the “knee-in-the-curve” and the blue line 
showing the total number of satellites that need to built to field the constellation. 
The total constellation production cost was slightly more than 33 Million FY00 
dollars, with an average satellite production cost of just less than 900 thousand FY00 
dollars.  The cost to operate the constellation per year was determined to about 4.3 
Million FY00 dollars.  Overall USG cost for the constellation over its MDL is slightly 
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VIII. POSSIBLE ORBIT INJECTION METHODS 
A. PRIMARY MISSION OF A “MOTHER-SHIP” COMMUNICATIONS 
SATELLITES OPERATING AT GEOSTATIONARY ORBIT 
A “Mother-ship satellite” is a satellite designed to carry smaller spacecraft that 
will eventually be deployed and operate separately.  While the mother-ship’s primary 
mission is to carry and then deploy its smaller satellites, it remains disguised as a normal 
satellite.  Communications is a logical disguise for a mother-ship satellite operating at 
geostationary orbit  
The mother-ship orbit injection method has many advantages.  A dedicated launch 
for a Mother-ship satellite could be secured if it carried enough smaller satellites to make 
it worthy of the launch cost.  Disguised as a communications satellite, it could offer an 
added benefit as a communications relay for the smaller satellites it carries.  If the smaller 
satellites needed to be completely undetected, they could communicate only to the 
“Mother-ship satellite” over a carrier band frequency that is absorbed by the earth’s 
atmosphere.  Even the deployment mechanism for the smaller satellites can be designed 
cleverly enough so it could double as a minor station keeping propulsion mechanism for 
the mother-ship.  All of these advantages make the “Mother-ship satellite” concept very 
appealing, but it is not perfect. 
The main drawback to this design is that the mother-ship will be stationed at a 
specific longitude in geostationary orbit.  The smaller satellites will therefore need a 
significant propulsion system to deploy and constitute the desired constellation that is 
needed to fulfill the optical survey mission.  The mother-ship could deploy the Half-
Meter-Cubes at their regular 30 day re-visit interval over the four and a half years it takes 
these satellites to circumnavigate geostationary orbit at their assigned altitude.  This 
timeframe needed to constitute the constellation is more than double the Half-Meter-
Cube satellite’s MDL.  It would take almost six times the MDL to constitute the 5U-
CubeSat constellation by this method.  To this extent, each smaller satellite would require 
a kick motor to propel them to form the constellation in a matter of weeks vice years.  
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This is not possible since each smaller satellite type does not have the power or volume 
available to support a kick motor and remain undetectable. 
Another option is to deploy several “Mother-ship satellites” equally spaced 
around geostationary orbit.  Each would require its own launch vehicle, but they could 
carry the number of smaller satellites needed to operate in their sector plus a few spares.  
When all of the “Mother-ship satellites” were operating on orbit they could begin to 
deploy their smaller satellites until the constellation was established.  Four Mother-ship 
satellites would be needed to deploy the Half-Meter-Cube constellation in just over a year 
and six Mother-ship satellites to deploy the 5U-CubeSat constellation in just under the 
two year MDL. 
The Mother-ship satellite method does seem possible, though it does have a few 
drawbacks. 
B. SECONDARY PAYLOAD ON A GEOSTATIONARY LAUNCH VEHICLE 
STP-1 launched in March of 2007 demonstrating the ability to launch secondary 
payloads to LEO utilizing the EELV Secondary Payload Adapter (ESPA) ring shown in 
Figure 8.  Each small satellite mated to the ESPA ring via a standard interface called a 
light-band.  The spring loaded light-band also gave the small satellites the necessary 
velocity to safely separate from the launch vehicle’s ESPA ring.  On that flight four small 
satellite secondary payloads were deployed without endangering the primary payload 
(OE mission) or the launch vehicle.  This launch demonstrated that spare mass and 
volume on a launch vehicle could be made available to secondary payloads in a standard 
inexpensive manner to LEO. 
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Figure 8.   EELV with a fully loaded ESPA ring of six secondary payloads. 
Applying such a system to launch vehicles with the performance to deliver large 
satellites to geostationary orbit seems reasonable.  Many launches bound for 
geostationary orbit likely have mass margin and a fair amount of excess volume inside of 
the fairing.  If this space could be made available to launch secondary payloads, an 
inexpensive ride to geostationary orbit could be possible.  A major obstacle is convincing 
the program management of the launch vehicle and the primary payload that this type of 
implementation is an intelligent use of resources and convincing them that it would not 
endanger the primary payload’s ability to reach its assigned orbit. 
This type of implementation seems like common sense and a wise use of limited 
launch infrastructure resources, but we are dealing with a very risk adverse space 
industry.  Each launch that fails in some manner to deliver its payload to the proper orbit, 
costs the parties involved hundreds of millions, and in some cases billions of dollars.  For 
these fiscal reasons, insurance for these flights are mandatory for commercial launches, 
and those rates can cost up to 25 percent of the insured cost of the satellite (payload)63.  
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The USG self-insures its own dedicated launches.  Every launch that fails will cause 
these rates to increase as well.  Launch failures may also cause budget cuts in current 
space programs forcing their schedules to slip.64  Risk is a real concern to these 
professionals, but it also causes advancements in technology and space operations to take 
a very long time to occur.  This society contains a large portion of men and women whom 
feel best when something is done because it has been done successfully that way in the 
past.65  That mentality is not sound reasoning but it does allow them to feel better about 
the operations they are planning to conduct in the future.  New methods are always over 
analyzed to determine any faults and usually not employed to their fullest extent the first 
few times they are used.  Change in the space industry occurs at a very slow rate and 
incentives must be used to convince commercial organizations of why they should 
change for it to occur at all. 
A very good reason needs to be identified to change anything in the commercial 
space field; most of these reasons involve increased revenue.  This is not the case in the 
military space industry.  If a satellite project shows that it can deliver a needed space 
product fulfilling a requirement for a relatively low cost it most likely will get funded.  If 
this project is funded, then a way to place the satellites into orbit will be determined.  The 
most cost effective way would be to lunch them as secondary payloads on geostationary 
bound launch vehicles with excess mass and volume.  This may make the respective 
program managers unhappy, but if these smaller satellites were to accomplish a critical 
SSA mission, then the military leaders will determine if this is allowed to happen.  They 
will analyze the entire benefit of the primary and secondary satellites’ missions and 
determine if this is acceptable.  What ever their decision the primary satellites program 
manager will execute the order. 
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In the 2009 to 2016 timeframe, the military is planning to launch four new 
communications satellite systems.66  Each communications system will be composed of 
at least three geostationary communications satellites.  Each satellite will have a 
dedicated launch to geostationary orbit and it is likely that each launch will have excess 
mass and volume margin.  These launches could be the method to deploy one of the 
smaller satellite constellations designed. 
Assuming that the available mass and volume aboard each of these launches were 
made available to launch one of these constellations, a few obstacles would still need to 
be overcome.  A standard integration and deployment method would need to be 
developed that was compatible to these launch vehicles and their primary payload.  
Assuming that the launch vehicle was a Delta IV or Atlas V EELV, a Centaur could be 
utilized to deliver the payloads to geostationary orbit. The secondary payloads could be 
integrated onto the Centaur.67.  The method could be in the form of an ESPA ring another 
method that made use of the spare volume inside of the fairing.  If this was possible, a 
very attractive method to launch one of these constellations would exist. 
Several launch vehicles will be required to space these smaller satellites around 
geostationary orbit to allow them to deploy the smaller satellites in an effective manner 
before the smaller satellites’ MDL expired.  This could be accomplished if the integrating 
method packaged the smaller satellites in bundles.  Each bundle will need to possess the 
ability to shield the satellites from the space environment effects while maintaining a safe 
storage environment until they needed to be deployed and when signaled deploy them.  
This adds another layer of complexity to the constellation design and development costs. 
If this method would be acceptable to the DoD program managers and they made 
mass and volume available to an acceptable interface method, the constellation’s time to 
orbit (TOO) would be dependant on the schedules of these primaries.  It is common 
knowledge that every recent DoD communications satellite program has faced various 
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problems that have forced them to delay their launches.  This trend does not seem to be 
getting any better.  If this launch method did become available to deliver one of the 
smaller satellite constellations to geostationary orbit, they would be forced to wait until 
their respective primaries were ready to launch.  This could result in a portion of the 
smaller satellite constellation having to wait several years on orbit until the remaining 
components of the constellation could be launched.  This would mandate a robust storage 
system to prevent the components on these smaller satellites from failing before the 
smaller satellites could operate through their MDL. 
This method could be accomplished.  Several key factors will need to be 
overcome for it to be possible, but this method certainly is not impossible.  Primary 
satellite program managers will need to be convinced that the secondary satellites will not 
induce any risk into their primary satellite’s launch.  It will add a few more layers of 
complexity and risk to the program but they can be mitigated through sound engineering.  
These layers will increase the time to develop the smaller satellites and their eventual 
deployment will depend on the primary satellites’ launch schedules, but it is a viable 
method to launch one of the smaller satellite constellations. 
C. MODULAR ADD-ON TO A GEOSTATIONARY BOUND SATELLITE 
Many satellites are launched to orbit with excess mass and volume.  If a 
secondary payload could be notified early enough to prepare for a launch of opportunity, 
then the launch vehicle’s excess performance could be put to use instead of being wasted.  
When the secondary payload was ready for launch it could then be encased in a standard, 
modular containment and deployment mechanism.  If sufficient volume was available on 
a primary satellite’s bus modular secondary satellite storage and deployment mechanisms 
could then be bolted to it.  Once the launch vehicle had delivered the primary satellite to 
orbit, the primary could choose to deploy the secondary satellites when it was directed.  
This method would optimize each launch and help smaller satellites with small budgets to 
get launched. 
This method applied to all launches could allow smaller satellites to ride with the 
primary satellites all the way out to geostationary orbit.  These smaller satellites would 
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not be restricted in only being able to ride with primaries that flew on launch vehicles 
delivered payloads to geostationary, but also ones that were delivered to geosynchronous 
transfer orbit (GTO).  Riding with the primary would allow these smaller satellites to be 
delivered to geostationary orbit by the primary satellite’s kick motor.  Once the primary 
had reached geostationary orbit it could deploy the smaller satellites when it was directed.  
Once each satellite was deployed it would use its propulsion system to execute the 
Hohmann transfers necessary to deliver it to its assigned altitude and assigned RAAN 
within the constellation. 
In the commercial space industry the greatest inhibitor to this method of utilizing 
this excess mass and volume is the primary satellite’s management’s aversion to risk.  
Their primary goal is to place their satellite, the rocket’s primary payload, into the 
satellite’s assigned orbit so it can start making them money.  To this extent, they do not 
want to do anything that might jeopardize their goal.  Any risk, however small, must be 
mitigated to some acceptable level.  You must convince them of how your satellite will 
benefit them, which is extremely difficult.  This obstacle is not as difficult to deal in the 
DoD.  If your program can deliver the desired results, a program manager for a primary 
could be ordered to integrate the secondary payload.  The risks will be analyzed and 
methods to mitigate the identified risks will be mitigated to the fullest extent.  The 
secondary payloads will then be fail-safe to the primary and launched. 
In the same manner a mind set in the commercial space industry must develop 
that evaluates the overall benefit of using this excess capacity in a safe manner that 
delivers the smaller satellites to orbit for this method to be realized.  If the benefit of this 
mission is analyzed in a separate way aside from monetarily, , then it could appear as a 
worthwhile option.  That would let the management of the primary satellite decide if they 
want to accept this added risk during launch and orbit insertion to obtain the benefit of 
the mission the smaller satellites and how it would enhance the nation’s SSA. 
As mentioned earlier, aversion to risk is a programmatic trait that has been bred 
into US satellite program managers due to past failures and the zero tolerance attitudes 
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for failure which predominate the USG’s leadership today.68  With this type of mentality, 
architecture to launch smaller satellites in an add-on modular mechanism bolted to a 
primary satellite’s bus, no matter how safe or beneficial is not viewed as a good option.  
Even if this method has the more benefits than risks, it still induces more risks to the 
primary satellite.  These reasons may mean this is not a desired option for the commercial 
space industry but maybe in the DoD space industry.  The modular add-on method must 
be accepted by the space community’s higher echelon to be employed to deliver 
secondary payloads to geostationary orbit.  It is a viable method, but will depend upon 
excess volume that primary satellites have available on their bus and the methods utilized 
to mitigate risk to the primary satellite.  This method will invariably induce several more 
development layers into the satellite program and make its constitution on orbit 
dependant upon the primary satellites’ launch schedules. 
                                                 





This study involved determining if satellites of established dimensions, not a 
particular payload size, could perform an optical survey mission of the satellites 
operating near geostationary orbit.  The Half-Meter-Cube satellite was chosen since it 
was just smaller than the smallest object that could be detected at geostationary orbit by 
current earth based sensors.  The 5U and 1U sized CubeSats were chosen due to the 
increasing appeal of these smaller satellites in space technology research and 
development fields.  Each satellite was designed using a hybrid spacecraft design method 
derived from the method described by SMAD.  The equations in SMAD were still used 
but applied in a different order.  No laws of physics were violated. 
The satellites were designed around a set structure size instead of sizing the entire 
satellite off of the payload needed to conduct the mission.  Working through these 
designs, early in the process it was determined that the 1U-CubeSat could not be 
designed to perform its assigned mission.  The determination was made due to the limited 
volume of the satellite and resulting inability to include a payload and all necessary sub-
systems.  The only types of payloads that would fit into the 1U-CubeSat were computer 
board mounted cameras.  Of the COTS payloads analyzed, the C328-7640 JPEG 
Compression VGA Module performed best, but still would have mandated an orbital 
altitude 500 meters below geostationary orbit.  The only other option was to build a 
custom deployable aperture similar to the aperture currently being built for the James 
Webb Space Telescope (JWST) by Ball Aerospace.  While it presents a concept to be 
able to utilize a useful size aperture, it is not currently feasible, nor will it be for the 
foreseeable future. 
The results of this study have shown that two of the three satellite sizes selected 
could indeed perform the optical survey mission of geostationary satellites.  These two 
constellations were then analyzed to determine if they could meet all mission objectives 
and also how much each constellation would cost to develop. 
 82
For comparison purposes of this conclusion all costs have been translated into 
current fiscal year dollars.  The TFU cost for the Half-Meter-Cube was determined to be 
about 1.8 million dollars, while the TFU cost for the 5U-CubeSat was around 1.6 Million 
dollars.  The 5U-CubeSat constellation requires 33 satellites, while the Half-Meter-Cube 
constellation only requires 15 satellites.  The overall cost savings to build the Half-Meter-
Cube constellation instead of the 5U-CubeSat constellation is almost 22 Million dollars, a 
huge cost difference for a small program.   
Acknowledging the life-cycle cost benefits of the Half-Meter-Cube constellation, 
each constellation’s performance was determined utilizing STK simulation.  Each 
simulation had an identical target set of fifty satellites and their respective smaller 
satellite constellation.  Through these simulations the Half-Meter-Cube constellation was 
able to imaging 100 percent of the satellites with an inclination less than 0.086 degrees 
and 94 percent of all the satellites in the simulation.  The 5U-CubeSat constellation was 
able to image 100 percent of the geostationary satellites, while only 86 percent of all the 
satellites in the simulation.  The larger optical payload in the Half-Meter-Cube satellite 
constellation gave them a true advantage allowing them to out perform the 5U-CubeSat 
constellation. 
From the analysis conducted, the Half-Meter-Cube constellation and the 5U-
CubeSat constellation both met all requirements set forth to effectively conduct the 
optical survey mission.  The value of the Half-Meter-Cube constellation was superior to 
the 5U-CubeSat constellation in its ability to conduct the optical survey at a lower 
constellation cost.  The only metric that was not used to compare them was how exactly 
these constellations could be injected into their assigned orbits. 
B. ORBIT INJECTION METHODS 
The most difficult problem facing the constitution of either satellite constellation 
is getting the satellites to orbit.  With the “Launch infrastructure currently tailored for 
large spacecraft.”69it is very difficult to launch smaller satellites.  For this reason 
                                                 
69 John Brock.  Operational Utility of Small Satellites.  SAB Summer Session, 28 June 2007.  Slide 
21. 
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launching smaller satellites to geostationary orbit is less practical than large more 
expensive satellites.  Launching smaller satellites to geostationary orbit is nearly 
impossible utilizing commercial launch services for secondary payloads, but DoD 
launches could be made available if the program can prove its value.  If the program is 
deemed worthy any of the methods discussed earlier could be impossible. 
The mother-ship method seems to be the most appealing method due to the nature 
of the launch.  It requires a few dedicated launches for the mother-ships and their 
secondary payloads, the smaller satellites.  The mother-ship is the primary payload for 
the launch vehicle, there is not another primary satellite to be endangered.  The launch 
schedules could be slated to deliver the mother-ship to their assigned geostationary 
orbital slots in a timely manner that would allow them to deploy their smaller satellite 
payloads in an effective manner to constitute the smaller satellite constellation with an 
optimal timeframe.  The smaller satellites could then begin to operate on their own 
mission’s timeframe. 
Of the two remaining methods to deliver the smaller satellites to geostationary 
orbit, the secondary payloads on a geostationary bound launch vehicle seem to be the 
most promising.  That method constitutes the lowest risk to a primary satellite since it is 
only integrated into the launch vehicle.  Therefore the risk it needs to mitigate only exists 
during launch.  The secondary payloads could even be partitioned away from the primary 
so there is no way a secondary could ever bump into the primary.  The modular add-on 
method being bolted to the primary’s bus would induce numerous potential risks to the 
primary satellite.  The methods to mitigate these risks would be more involved than the 
just integrating to the launch vehicle, so this method is less likely to occur but not 
impossible.  Each of these methods is much more likely to be accepted by the DoD to 
deliver viable secondary payloads to orbit than in the commercial space industry. 
The Air Force’s goal is to have “~20 domestic Small Sat launches/payloads per 
year by 2015.”70  The Air Force does not state its exact method for these launches, but 
has made it their goal.  This goal seems achievable by 2015 if the development of non-
                                                 
70 John Brock.  Operational Utility of Small Satellites.  SAB Summer Session, 28 June 2007.  Slide 
27. 
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traditional launch service providers such as SPACEX and Rocketplane Kistler mature at 
their projected current schedule.  This will open up more launch sites and launch vehicle 
options that will hopefully solve some of the launch problem that currently exists in the 
US, however, these solutions do not address the problem of establishing a method by 
which smaller satellites can reach geostationary orbit without a dedicated launch. 
Even though the Mother-ship concept would need its own dedicated launch, it 
may be the reason the program would not be funded.  For this type of small program, the 
launch vehicle would cost four to five times the cost of the entire smaller satellite 
constellation.  From that standpoint, it would be very difficult to convince the JROC to 
approve it unless they were able to view the operational gains of the project instead of the 
launch cost eclipsing the cost to build the constellation of smaller satellites.  Cheaper 
satellite than their launch vehicles have been launched in the past, but it still could be a 
hard sell. 
For this reason, the modular add-on method for orbit injection seems the most 
viable option at this time.  It offers several launch opportunities per year onboard 
geostationary communications and weather satellites that are launched with excess mass 
and volume margin.  This method does not involve modifying the launch vehicle or the 
primary’s deployment in any way.  For these reasons, the launch vehicle’s overall 
reliability and operation will not be impacted.  Although risk will be mitigated to it fullest 
extent, the only party that would be impacted is the primary satellite.  Even though this 
method seems to be the most simplified from a common sense approach, it will not be 
easy to impose. 
The true obstacle that must be overcome is the protective nature of the primary 
satellite’s management.  This can be overcome within the DoD, but not easily in the 
commercial sector.  If those programs can be convinced that this type of project is worth 
the added risk, then this could be a very viable option to populate a geostationary belt 
observation constellation.  In the near future there should be a large variety of satellites to 
ride along with. 
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The TCA envisions a Global Information Grid (GIG) that includes the 
Wideband Global SATCOM (WGS) for unprotected wideband, the 
Mobile User Objective System (MUOS or next generation narrowband) 
scheduled for launch in 2009, the Advanced Extremely High Frequency 
(AEHF next generation protected, a.k.a. Milstar III) to be launched 
between 2008-2011, an Advanced Polar System for various strategic 
missions, and the Transformational Communications Satellite (TSAT) 
system that could be launched from 2013 as a major upgrade, instead of 
deploying AEHF #4 & 5.71 
Any or all of these satellites could be the vehicle to transport a constellation of 
smaller satellites to operate near geostationary orbit.  The DoD would simply have to 
instruct those respective program managers to integrate the necessary secondary 
payloads. 
C. POSSIBLE SURVEY MISSIONS VARIANTS 
The requirements for the survey mission were established to allow the entire 
geostationary belt of satellites to be imaged every 30 days over two years.  A primary 
requirement in addition to the survey mission was that the imaging satellites were to 
remain undetectable by earth based optical and radar sensors.  While these overarching 
requirements require a complete constellation, many benefits can be obtained by 
launching a partial constellation, a single satellite with a specific mission or even launch 
a complete constellation over time and using the satellites as they arrive to orbit. 
The major drawback is the cost in schedule and dollars for launching a complete 
constellation.  If the constellation was launched in a segmented fashion, partial effects 
could be delivered as spacecraft are launched.  It would allow immediate results as soon 
as some of the satellites could reach their operating altitudes.  This method may prevent 
the entire constellation from ever being established during the satellites’ MDL.  It does 
provide a reliable means to gather some results as quickly as possible.  The launch  
 
 
                                                 
71 “Special Report: The USA's Transformational Communications Satellite System (TSAT).”  23 July 
2007.  28 August 2007.  <http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/special-report-the-usas-transformational-
communications-satellite-system-tsat-0866/>. 
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segment and satellite insertion remains the most difficult problem, but this method allows 
immediate operations, vice a potential long storage on orbit until the entire constellation 
could be constituted. 
A partial constellation deployed from a single launch can produce some results 
that have the potential to be very useful.  A partial constellation may consist of two or 
more satellites that could have an identical mission to the one described previously with 
the exception of the 30 day target re-visit rate.  This would require the satellites to 
possess the same spacing required previously for a completer constellation.  A semi-
constellation of this type could be used to image a section of high interest targets over 
their two year mission life. 
From a purely hypothetical approach, assume the high interest targets were 
operating over Asia, with a number of satellites operating from 87.5 to 122.0 degrees east 
longitude along the geostationary belt.  That region represents 34.5 degrees, or slightly 
less than ten percent of the geostationary belt.  If the orbital spacing and altitudes were 
the same as for the complete constellations, then seven Half-Meter-Cube satellites and six 
5U-CubeSats would be required to complete this mission.72  Each respective partial 
constellation would need to be seeded properly so that the first satellite in each would 
complete its inspection of the final satellite of interest at the end of the 30 day re-visit 
period.  At that point the next satellite in the partial constellation should be at the position 
in which the first satellite started its operations.  These partial constellations would be 
able to perform this type of mission, but delivering them to their specific orbital slots 
would still be difficult. 
A single satellite of each constellation type would be able to perform two 
different variants of the survey mission.  This application would also alleviate the need 
for multiple launches.  A single satellite could be launched in any of the previously 
mentioned methods and would not encounter the potential difficulties of having to wait 
for years until the entire constellation could reach orbit for it to begin operations.  The 
first variety is to survey a single satellite.  It could be launched into an orbit of any 
                                                 
72 Appendix G. 
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altitude and inclination that was needed to observe the target of interest.  The other 
method is an extension of the single target satellite option, which could include a targeted 
region only using one imaging satellite.  This single satellite could be inserted into an 
orbit to observe as many targets as possible until it could no longer operate.  A satellite of 
this design could certainly have some utility to the DoD. 
Another option is to openly conduct the mission.  This type of mission would no 
longer carry the dimension size constraint, which allows for larger optics to be carried by 
the satellite’s payload.  In that manner a small satellite utilizing COTS equipment could 
be build on a small budget.  An IKONOS-like satellite could be built and then operated at 
a 350 kilometers sub-geostationary orbit to obtain a 20 centimeter spatial resolution of 
targets.  At this altitude the IKONOS-like satellite would circumnavigate the 
geostationary belt in 233 days.  Four of these satellites would be needed to constitute an 
equally spaced, non-inclined constellation at a 30 day re-visit rate.  This type of 
constellation would also discourage our enemies from placing convert objects in the 
geostationary belt, or at a minimum let them know the USG’s capabilities to observe such 
an action.  A project such as this may gain public support, without it though, it may be 
impossible to build.  Regardless this type of satellite would be a solution to the current 
SSA need. 
D. FOLLOW-ON RESEARCH 
As with any study, this one could certainly be continued and improved upon.  The 
following sections list a few avenues that could be pursued to determine a better solution 
for this area of SSA. 
1. Realistic STK Simulation 
The foundations for the survey mission were established to allow the entire 
geostationary belt of satellites to be imaged every 30 days over two years.  These 
requirements were the foundation for a STK simulation.  The STK simulation created and 
utilized for this study was sufficient, but it was not a realistic model.  Simplification was 
required for the simulation to run on computing hardware that was available for this 
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study.  The simplified STK simulation was contained to about one-fifth of the satellites73 
that are known to operate near geostationary. 
If a realistic simulation could be conducted using a more powerful computer then 
it would be possible to create a scenario that would include every known geosynchronous 
and geostationary satellite using the most up to date TLEs.  A simulation of this type 
could allow the researcher to determine the actual coverage of the constellation and then 
optimize the constellation’s orbital characteristics.  An optimization of this would provide 
an accurate number of images capture per day per satellite.  That information would give 
a complete understanding of the link budget demands for each satellite of the selected 
constellation.  With this information an accurate impact to the AFSCN and TDRSS 
systems could be determined.  Then the true impact upon these systems could be 
determined.  This would determine if this type of imaging constellation could be 
supported by the AFSCN and TDRSS in their current form or if another data relay or 
ground station network would need to be utilized, augmented or created. 
2. Satellite Re-Design 
An individual could explore satellite designs utilizing a customized component 
approach to the design of each subsystem.  This may produce some interesting results 
from a performance and cost analysis. 
Following current technology development trends components should continue to 
shrink and more useful in the future.  This may allow each size of satellite to become 
much more useful and even incorporate redundancy in key system to increase MDL.  A 
complete satellite re-design in the future may be necessary to take advantages of these 
technologies.  Such a re-design may come to different conclusions than the author’s 
current conclusion and offer a better solution to this area of SSA. 
                                                 
73“Commercial Communications Satellites Geosynchronous Orbit”.  30 June 2006.  12 June 2007.  
<http://www.boeing.com/defense-space/space/bss/launch/980031_001.pdf>. 
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3. Other Missions That Could Be Performed 
With technology evolving newly developed COTS components may enable other 
missions to be conducted by smaller satellites near geostationary orbit.  Missions such as 
service denial and anti-satellite missions are very appealing.  Science missions such as 
space physics and space weather may not be as glamorous but are equally practical and 
important. 
Sparse apertures are becoming more relevant today at they continue to attract 
attention and research.  In the not so distanced future, smaller satellites will be used in 
this construct.  Most likely initially demonstrated at LEO they will ultimately be 
deployed in geostationary orbit.  Such applications to smaller satellites may one day 
enable the USG to possess high resolution, long dwell imagers are geostationary orbit. 
A Space Operations student could even begin now by devising a CONOPS for 
any such mission.  Even though the technology is not currently developed, a CONOPS 
can help determine if the validity of the application.  Researchers may gain insight from 
such a study, which may allow them to avoid potential pitfalls exploring equipment that 
could never be utilized or employed. 
4. Casting, Development of Launch Architecture Given Improved STK 
Analysis 
The largest challenge to fielding a constellation of smaller satellites near 
geostationary orbit is getting the satellites to orbit.  This challenge is due to fiscal 
constraints and our current launch infrastructure.  With a realistic STK simulation 
created, and an optimized smaller satellite constellation devised a method could be 
formulated on how to properly populate this constellation.  The method would need to 
detail which orbital regime would be populated, the method to transport these smaller 
satellites and the manner in which the smaller satellites would reach their assigned 
positions in the constellation.  After these characteristics are determined a comparison 
between partial and full constellation performance would determine how best to utilize 
these satellites as they reached orbit.  If that comparison determined that only the 
complete constellation effects are desirable, then a determination of the maximum on-
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orbit storage time would need to be estimated so that the satellite’s MDL would not 
decease.  If a partial constellation’s effects were desirable, then a cost versus benefit 
evaluation would allow the number of useful satellites be determined.  With these 
evaluations, the cost to develop a constellation of smaller satellites and operate them over 
their MDL could be accurately estimated. 
5. The Unforeseen 
With any study that has been completed, the future is unknown.  Someone reading 
this thesis may be inspired in someway that the author can not predict.  It is the author’s 
hope that this study will inspire a reader to look at the aspect of SSA in a new 
innovational light that will allow the USG to better accomplish this mission.  Whatever 
that could be, the author looks forward to its development. 
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APPENDIX C.  1U-CUBESAT DESIGN EXCEL WORKBOOK 
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APPENDIX F.  EXCEL WORKBOOK OF STK SIMULATION COVERAGE REPORTS FOR HALF-
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